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In its ruling of 25 August 2025, the District Court of North Holland had to assess whether the appellant could invoke the principle of legitimate expectations on the basis of statements made by the Municipal Executive of Alkmaar.

First, a brief explanation of the principle of legitimate expectations, more specifically when the principle applies. Three conditions must be met. First, there must be a concrete and unambiguous commitment from which the citizen could derive a legitimate expectation. Secondly, the promise must be attributable to the administrative body. This prevents every statement made by a civil servant from falling under the principle of legitimate expectations. Thirdly, it must be considered whether, in the specific case, it is reasonable to require the administrative body to act on the confidence that has been created. In other words, a balance must be struck between the interests of the citizen in whom the legitimate expectation has been created and (among other things) the public interest. 

Now to the case. The appellant had submitted a permit application for the conversion of an office space into nine flats. The environmental permit applied for was initially granted, but was subsequently withdrawn following an objection by a third party, on the grounds that the new flats would disproportionately increase parking pressure in the area. The appellant then lodged an appeal. Among other things, she argued that this was contrary to the principle of legitimate expectations. She claimed that the council had given her legitimate expectations that her plan could be realised.

The situation is as follows: before submitting the permit application, the appellant submitted a request for advice to the council. The council responded positively to this request for advice, concluding, among other things, that parking pressure in the area would not increase. However, the council did make the reservation that other aspects and interests still had to be assessed and weighed up and that it was therefore not yet certain that the environmental permit would be granted.

According to the appellant, the council's comment that parking pressure would not increase gave the appellant a legitimate expectation that the environmental permit would be granted and therefore the environmental permit could not be withdrawn on that basis. The court agrees with the appellant's position. The fact that the response to the request for advice indicated that it was not certain that the environmental permit would be granted does not alter this, because this reservation only concerned the “other aspects and interests” and not the traffic pressure. After all, that had already been established.

In concrete terms, there was a violation of the principle of legitimate expectations, because the council had given the appellant the legitimate expectation that traffic pressure would not prevent the granting of the environmental permit, but the council nevertheless revoked the environmental permit on that ground.

If you have any questions about the principle of legitimate expectations, please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman.

You can read the ruling here.

When an interested party submits an enforcement request, the competent authority must, in principle, always take enforcement action. This is known as the principle of mandatory enforcement. There are two exceptions to this rule. The first is the principle of proportionality. If enforcement action in a specific case is disproportionate to the objectives to be achieved, the administrative body must refrain from enforcement. The second is a concrete prospect of legalisation. In short, this means that the violation will be legalised in the short term.

Concrete prospect of legalisation exists if an environmental permit is granted that legalises the violation. However, the ruling of the Division of 27 August 2025 shows that not all environmental permits granted provide a concrete prospect of legalisation. The ruling concerns an enforcement request submitted by a local resident against a nearby livestock farm, which is causing him nuisance. The council takes the position that there is indeed a violation, because the livestock farm is located too close to the local resident's home. Nevertheless, the enforcement request is rejected because of concrete prospects of legalisation. This is because an environmental permit has been granted for the construction of a new barn at a different location on the plot, to replace part of the existing barns. The council believes that this will remedy the violation and that enforcement was therefore unnecessary.

The Division disagrees. It ruled that there was no concrete prospect of legalisation, because the granting of the permit for the new barn did not legalise the existing situation. It merely permitted a new situation with the aim of complying with the relevant legislation and regulations.

This ruling limits the application of the exception of a concrete prospect of legalisation to situations in which the violation is actually legalised. The exception therefore does not apply to situations in which only a new, legal situation is created in a different location.

You can read the ruling here.

This case concerned an employee who had been employed as a welder since 1995. Following a motorbike accident in 2019, he became completely incapacitated for work. The employer's obligation to continue paying wages, including wage sanctions, ultimately ended on 1 March 2024. As a return to work was no longer possible, the employee requested the employer to terminate the employment contract by means of a settlement agreement, with the award of a transition payment. However, the employer refused to cooperate.

Xella ruling

The subdistrict court judge put an end to this attitude and explicitly referred to the Xella ruling of the Supreme Court (2019). In that ruling, it was decided that, on the basis of good employment practices (Section 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code), an employer is obliged to cooperate in the termination of a dormant employment contract, with payment of the transition allowance.

In line with this, the court terminated the employment contract and awarded a transition payment of more than € 37.500,00. In addition, the employer had to pay more than € 13.000,00 for unused holiday days. Why? Because even after 104 weeks of incapacity for work, the accrual of statutory holiday days continues.

Accrual of holiday entitlement after 104 weeks

Last year, another judge at the Gelderland District Court ruled that no holiday entitlement is accrued during the period in which there is no longer any entitlement to wages. This follows from Dutch legislation (Section 7:634(1) of the Dutch Civil Code). Although that judge also indicated last year that our regulations are contrary to European law and case law, he did not want to risk ruling against the law.

In this case, the subdistrict court in Arnhem came to a different conclusion: there is indeed a power to rule against national law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides a solution for this.

For the lawyers among us, the subdistrict court explained this as follows: Article 31(2) of the Charter also enshrines the right to holidays. In the Max Planck judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified that Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can be invoked in a dispute between private individuals. Furthermore, the Court ruled that, if a national regulation cannot be interpreted in such a way that it is compatible with Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it is up to the national court to ensure, within the framework of its powers, the legal protection resulting from that provision and to guarantee its full effect by, if necessary, disapplying the national legislation that conflicts with it. In the literature, it is argued that, similarly, a Dutch employer cannot invoke the restriction in Article 7:634(1) of the Dutch Civil Code, which stipulates that an employee only accrues holiday entitlement if he is entitled to wages.

In other words, the fact that an employee only accrues holiday hours for the period during which he is entitled to wages is contrary to European law.

Important information for all employers and non-lawyers: Sick employees accrue full (statutory) holiday hours for the entire period of illness, and not just for the first two years, regardless of whether they perform work and regardless of whether they are entitled to wages.

Our advice: assess in good time whether the employment contract of an employee who is still incapacitated for work after 104 weeks should be terminated and do so in the correct manner. This will prevent unnecessary proceedings and additional (holiday) costs.

It is unlikely that this ruling will lead to a large number of additional tax assessments. This is because most settlement agreements include a final discharge clause.

If you have any questions, please contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema and Elke Hofman.

You can read the ruling here.

It is a well-known point of discussion in administrative law: the sending and receiving of decisions by administrative bodies. Normally, a decision is deemed to have been sent correctly if the administrative body can demonstrate that it was sent to the correct address by a recognised postal service provider. 

Does this always mean that a citizen or company claiming that a decision has not been received is left empty-handed? In its ruling of 20 August 2025, the Division ruled that this is not the case. The case revolved around the appellant's appeal against a ruling by the District Court of The Hague. The court had declared the appellant's appeal inadmissible because it had been lodged outside the appeal period. The appellant argued that she had received the decision on the objection too late, which meant that she was unable to lodge an appeal within the time limit. According to the court, the decision on the objection was correctly addressed and dated, and there was also proper dispatch documentation, which made it sufficiently plausible that the decision on the objection had been sent. The appellant disagreed with this ruling and lodged an appeal with the Division. 

The Division agreed with the court's ruling that it had been made sufficiently plausible that the decision had been sent. However, the Division also ruled that the appellant had not sufficiently rebutted the presumption of receipt, partly because the appellant had demonstrated that she had inquired several times with the council about the status of the objection procedure, but also because, after she had finally received the decision on the objection, she had quickly lodged an appeal shortly after the appeal period had expired. 

In concrete terms, this meant that, despite the board having demonstrated that the decision had been sent, the appellant had sufficiently demonstrated that she had not received the decision. The appellant's appeal to the Division was therefore declared well-founded and she should have been declared admissible by the court.

You can read the ruling here.

If an administrative body imposes a penalty decision, such as an order subject to a penalty or an order subject to administrative coercion, this must be based on a verifiable determination of relevant facts and circumstances. After all, enforcement action is only possible if there has been a violation.
 
In the ruling of the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State of 13 August 2025, it had to be determined how and by whom these facts and circumstances should be gathered. In this case, the council had decided not to take enforcement action on the basis of checks carried out by an expert, but had disregarded photographs from third parties that were relevant.

The Division ruled that the facts and circumstances must be established by an expert, on the instructions of the competent authority. The established facts and circumstances must then be recorded in a clear manner. This can be done in a written report, for example, but also with photographs. The relevant facts and circumstances do not have to be observed (only) by the expert himself. Facts and circumstances can also be established by inferring them from documents found by the expert. These may include photographs taken by third parties or other types of information and documents. In some cases, it is therefore not sufficient to base a decision on whether or not to take enforcement action solely on checks carried out by the expert if other relevant information is also available that needs to be considered. 

Read the ruling here. 

Once again, it has been demonstrated that employment law is never dull. On 29 July 2025, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled in a case in which an employee, after almost 37 years of service, took a bag of liver sausages with him at the end of his shift. The meat producer dismissed the employee with immediate effect. The Court ruled that the summary dismissal was not legally valid. This ruling shows once again that summary dismissal can still lead to considerable disputes.

What happened:

At this meat producer, it was not unusual to place a “staff crate” with sausages at the exit so that colleagues could take them home. The sausages in question were no longer saleable for various reasons. The employee in question had taken a bag to put some sausages in and taken them home. The receptionist saw the bag and – although this is not clear from the ruling – (probably) reported it. According to the employer, this was theft, but according to the employee, it was simply part of a long-standing practice: unsaleable sausages could be taken home by employees.

Judgment of the Court:

The summary dismissal was not upheld. Although the employer had included in its Internal Regulations that it was not permitted to take products, goods or property without paying for them, the Court ruled that this was contrary to the “crate custom” in that department. There was therefore no clear and comprehensible policy. In addition, the employer did not sufficiently take into account the personal circumstances of the employee in its decision to dismiss him with immediate effect. A 59-year-old employee with almost 37 years of service at a sausage manufacturer who is dismissed with immediate effect does not, in the words of the Court, have a “particularly rosy” position on the labour market.
  
The employee not only received his transition payment, but also fixed compensation and fair compensation of € 150,000 gross. People say, “you pay for what you get”, but in this case, the sausage also proved to be an expensive affair.

Advice to entrepreneurs:

• Ensure clear and consistent policies. A rule in the internal regulations is not worth the paper it is written on if daily practice shows something completely different.
• Be alert to habits that undermine policy – Informal practices can be tolerated for years, but make it difficult to take sudden action.
• Take personal circumstances into account. Years of loyal service carry considerable weight in the assessment of summary dismissal.
• Document and communicate. Ensure that employees know in black and white what is and is not allowed, and repeat this regularly.
• Act carefully when dismissing someone with immediate effect. One wrong step can lead to high compensation payments and damage to your reputation.

Do you have any questions about dismissal with immediate effect or about drawing up clear policy? Please contact Dennis Oud, Tim van Riel, Tessa Sipkema or Elke Hofman-Bijvank.

You can read the ruling here.