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Normally, an enforcement decision by an administrative body is sent to the offender by letter. The offender may then lodge an objection and/or appeal against that written decision. In exceptional cases, there is no written decision and the administrative body merely informs the offender orally that enforcement is to take place. In its judgment of 5 August 2026, the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State had to rule on the scope of the rights to lodge an objection and/or appeal in such cases.

The case discussed in the ruling concerned a scaffold in Groningen. The owner of a property had a permit to leave the scaffold on the pavement temporarily, from 8 November to 3 December 2021. However, during an inspection on 22 December 2021, it transpired that the scaffold had not been removed. Enforcement officers then informed the property owner by telephone that the scaffolding had to be removed by 24 December at the latest.

During an inspection on 24 December, it became apparent that the owner had not yet done so. He was then told that the scaffolding had to be removed by 3.00 pm that afternoon, otherwise the council would have it removed at the owner’s expense. The owner did not let it come to that. He had the scaffolding dismantled and removed by his own scaffolder. He subsequently asked the municipal executive to put in writing what he considered to be the administrative order that had been imposed on him. The council refused, as it took the view that no decision had been taken at all that needed to be set out in writing.

The owner lodged an objection against the refusal to put the (alleged) administrative enforcement order in writing. The municipal executive declared that objection unfounded, whereupon the owner took the matter to court.

The court ruled in favour of the municipal executive. According to the court, there was no question of (extremely) urgent administrative enforcement, as the owner ultimately had the scaffolding removed himself. The council therefore did not actually proceed to impose an administrative order. According to the court, there was also no question of an ordinary administrative order, as this is only possible if a written decision is issued, which was precisely what was missing in this case.

The owner did not accept this and lodged an appeal with the Division. The Division ruled as follows. According to Article 5:21 of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), an order subject to administrative coercion consists of two elements: an obligation to remedy a contravention and the administrative body’s power to carry out that remedy itself if necessary. In view of that wording, the Division held that it is not decisive whether the administrative body actually enforced the order. After all, a standard order subject to administrative coercion is specifically intended to ensure that the offender remedies the breach themselves, so that actual administrative coercion (the council remedying the breach) is not necessary. 

Although the owner ultimately removed the scaffolding himself, an administrative order had indeed been issued. The remedial measure was clear, there was a specific deadline by which the situation had to be rectified, and the notice was addressed to the offender. Furthermore, it was clear that this was not a non-binding request to remove the scaffolding.

It then remained to be assessed what legal remedies were available against a decision not issued in writing. The Division equates the oral administrative enforcement order with a (written) decision, meaning that the same legal remedies are available against it. The reason for this is that, by refusing to put the administrative enforcement order in writing, the municipal executive was able to prevent the administrative court from assessing the lawfulness of the order. According to the Division, this is not the intention.

The Division’s final ruling was therefore that an administrative enforcement order had been issued and that the council was required to assess the substance of the objections raised by the owner against it. This not only gives the owner the opportunity to obtain a ruling on the lawfulness of the enforcement action, but also – should the enforcement indeed prove to be unlawful – to claim compensation.

Do you have any questions about (proposed) enforcement by an administrative body? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or myself.

You can read the judgment here. 

An employer had doubts as to whether an employee was working sufficient hours whilst working from home. Without discussing this with him beforehand, his log-in and log-out details were examined. On the basis of that information, the employee was summarily dismissed. The subdistrict court judge firmly rejected this.

According to the judge, the employer had insufficient grounds for the covert investigation. The employee was permitted to work from home, had been performing well shortly beforehand and, moreover, had previously indicated that he was experiencing a heavy workload. Furthermore, it could not be readily deduced from the login records how many hours he had actually worked. After all, tasks such as consultations, planning or analysis can also take place without someone being constantly logged into the company network.

According to the court, the employer should first have engaged in dialogue. A warning, clear agreements on availability, time recording or a performance improvement plan would have been less severe and more appropriate measures. The summary dismissal was therefore declared invalid. The employer was ordered to pay, amongst other things, a transition payment, compensation for wrongful termination and fair compensation of € 60,000.00.

For employers, the message is clear. Concerns regarding an employee’s performance, attendance or the number of hours worked must be taken seriously. However, covert monitoring and summary dismissal require a very careful approach. The employer must be able to demonstrate that there is a genuine reason for a covert investigation. The court refers to this as a ‘legitimate interest’. You should therefore ensure there is a clear justification, an appropriate monitoring policy and a valid basis under the GDPR. Discuss any suspicions with the employee first and consider whether a less drastic measure is possible. A carefully compiled file can ultimately make the difference between a lawful decision and costly legal proceedings.

You can read the ruling here.

On 26 June 2026, the Gelderland District Court issued an interim ruling on the status of the facts in a final judgement. 

What was the issue? A married couple had built an extension to their home in Arnhem. This consisted of a conservatory, a canopy, an extension to the garage and a lean-to. The extension had been in place since 2008. However, it later transpired that part of it was situated on land zoned as ‘Green’, which was not permitted under the local plan. An environmental permit had never been applied for. 

In February 2023, a local resident submitted an enforcement request, following which an order subject to a penalty payment was imposed. An objection and appeal procedure ensued. In its ruling at the end of 2025, the court upheld the couple’s appeal, as the council’s calculation of the extension’s surface area was incorrect. The local authority did not appeal against this court ruling. However, in March 2026, a new decision was taken, upholding the order subject to a penalty payment. The couple then lodged a further appeal, partly because, in the new decision, the local authority had suddenly assumed that the extension encroached by 1.31 metres into the green belt. 

In the 2025 ruling, the court had in fact held that ‘it was not in dispute between the parties’ that the extension encroached 30 centimetres into the green belt. As the local authority had not appealed against the ruling, the couple believed that the local authority was bound by that 30-centimetre figure and had therefore wrongly assumed, in the new decision of March 2026, that the encroachment was 1.31 metres. 

The court did not agree with this and ruled as follows. It is true that an administrative body which does not lodge an appeal (or a further appeal) against a judgment is bound by the legal findings in that judgment. This means, therefore, that the administrative body accepts the judgment, concurs with the court’s assessment and must also comply with it. 

However, contrary to the couple’s assertion, this does not apply to the ‘mere statement of facts’. This means that the court’s statement of the facts – in which it was held that ‘it was not in dispute between the parties’ that the extension encroached 30 centimetres into the green belt – could not be binding on the local authority. The council was therefore entitled to base its decision on a depth of 1.31 metres within the green zone. 

Incidentally, this did not result in the couple’s appeal being dismissed as unfounded. The court ruled that the local authority had failed to provide sufficient justification as to why enforcement in this case was proportionate. Whilst the court acknowledged that the 1.31-metre encroachment was more than a minor one, it found that there was no serious encroachment on the green space, as only 1.31 metres of the 15-metre-deep green strip was occupied by the extension. The local authority had therefore failed to demonstrate sufficiently what interests were served by the enforcement, whilst it was clear that the couple had a significant interest in preventing the costly demolition of the extension. 

This ruling thus emphasises two important legal principles. Firstly, the court makes it clear that an irrevocable ruling does not mean that the facts have also become irrevocable and indisputable. Secondly, the court reiterates that enforcement must always be proportionate. 

Do you have any questions about enforcement proceedings? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or myself. 

You can read the ruling here. 

To mark our firm’s 30th anniversary, we organised a fully catered golf day for our clients on Tuesday 7 July – and what a fantastic day we had!

Everything fell into place: sunshine, a friendly group of participants, enjoyable flights and flawless organisation by Capelle Golf Club. What’s more, Restaurant Mulligan took care of every last detail, with delicious canapés, drinks and an extensive buffet. It was lovely to see how everyone struck up conversations, took to the course in good spirits and, above all, had a great time.

We look back on a more than successful day with pride and gratitude!

To everyone who was there: thank you for your presence and enthusiasm. You made this anniversary day unforgettable!

Here’s to many more wonderful years, valuable collaborations and lovely encounters!🎉

Team De Haij & Van der Wende Advocaten

On June 24, 2026, the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State issued an important ruling regarding the use of a previously granted environmental permit for a subsequent illegal expansion.

The facts of this case were as follows. In 2022, the Municipal Executive of De Ronde Venen granted the plaintiff an environmental permit for the construction of a barn to be used as a horse boarding facility. The barn was permitted to be 16 meters long. However, during an inspection in 2024, it was found that the barn was not 16 meters long, but 20 meters. Thus, the construction did not comply with the environmental permit that had been granted. The plaintiff submitted a new permit application to legalize the longer barn, but the municipal executive refused to grant the environmental permit.

The claimant’s objection and, later, his appeal to the district court were declared unfounded. Subsequently, the Division had to assess whether the municipal executive had rightly refused the environmental permit for the expansion.

The plaintiff argued that the municipal council had explicitly approved the use of the property as a horse boarding facility in 2022. The expansion of the barn from 16 to 20 meters would merely be a continuation of that already permitted use and would therefore be permitted under the 2022 environmental permit.

The Division disagreed. It ruled that the 2022 environmental permit applied only to the construction plan submitted at that time: a 16-meter barn to be used as a horse boarding facility. The environmental permit allowed for a deviation from the zoning plan but did not amend the zoning plan itself. Consequently, it did not create any possibility to carry out future expansions - in violation of the zoning plan - on the basis of that permit. After all, in 2022, that was not part of the plan for which the permit had been granted.

With this ruling, the Division has confirmed that the established case law under the Wabo on this matter also applies under the Environment Act. Thus, under the Environment Act as well, an environmental permit for an activity outside the zoning plan (BOPA) only grants permission to carry out the requested activity and therefore does not allow for future (illegal) expansions.

Do you have questions about expanding a structure or changing the use of your property, and what permits are required for that? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or me.

You can read the ruling here.

A recent ruling by the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal once again demonstrates that employers must exercise caution when engaging self-employed individuals, interim professionals, and contractors through their own private limited company (B.V.).

In this case, a certified public accountant worked for an accounting firm through his own company. The parties had deliberately opted for a contract for services. Invoices included VAT, and the agreement explicitly stated that no employment contract was intended. It also stipulated that the worker could not later claim that an employment contract existed.

Nevertheless, the court ruled that an employment contract did exist.

In reaching this conclusion, the court did not focus on what the parties called the agreement, but rather on the agreed-upon rights and obligations and their actual implementation, considered in their mutual context. The accountant performed core tasks for the organization, worked full-time, was required to perform the work in person, had limited flexibility to work for other clients, and received a fixed monthly compensation. In addition, agreements had been made regarding, among other things, vacation days and the location where the work was performed.

These circumstances carried significant weight. According to the court of appeals, the fact that the parties themselves did not wish to enter into an employment contract was not a decisive factor. After all, the classification of an employment relationship is determined on the basis of the agreed-upon rights and obligations and the manner in which they are carried out.

It is noteworthy that the court also took into account that the worker himself had deliberately arranged for the arrangement through his private limited company and had derived a tax benefit from it. The court described his subsequent invocation of employee protection as unsympathetic and opportunistic. Nevertheless, this did not preclude the conclusion that an employment contract existed.

Because the working relationship was classified as an employment contract, the employer should not have terminated the agreement without the employee’s consent or authorization from the UWV. The employer was therefore ordered to pay compensation for wrongful termination, a transition payment, and equitable compensation.

However, the court of appeals did qualify the financial consequences. The agreed-upon assignment fee was not automatically equated with wages. According to the court, the fee also included elements related to the chosen assignment structure, such as flexibility and the absence of regular protection against dismissal. The court therefore established a lower gross monthly wage for the calculation of the compensation.

This ruling is part of a broader trend. Not only the courts but also the legislature are continuing to push for a reassessment of self-employed contractor relationships.

On June 16, 2026, the Senate approved the Act on the Introduction of a Legal Presumption of an Employment Contract Based on an Hourly Rate. The introduction of this legal presumption makes it easier for self-employed individuals who earn less than 38 euros per hour (as of January 1, 2026) to claim that they have an employment contract. 

If a self-employed person working below this threshold invokes this legal presumption, the burden of proof shifts. It is then up to the client to demonstrate that no employment contract exists. If the client fails to do so, the self-employed person can claim employee protections, such as continued wage payments and protection against dismissal.

It is important to note that no transitional provisions have been announced. The legal presumption will therefore also apply to existing agreements as of the law’s effective date. Organizations that work with lower-paid self-employed individuals would therefore be wise not to wait until the law formally takes effect.

The message is clear: a good contract remains important, but it is not enough. Look at the practical reality: what work is being performed, how independent is the contractor really, how regular is the work, how is payment made, and what instructions or organizational integration are in place?

The new legal presumption introduces an additional risk for low-wage self-employed individuals. Not only will the content of the agreement and its actual performance matter, but the hourly rate may also serve as the starting point for a discussion regarding employee status.

Do you have any questions? Please contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Noa Bilogrevic, or Elke Hofman-Bijvank. 

You can read the ruling here.