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On May 12, 2026, the House of Representatives approved the “Greater Security for Flexible Workers” bill. This marks an important step toward stricter regulations for flexible work.

These are the key changes for employers:

• Zero-hour contracts are being phased out: a fixed minimum and maximum number of hours will be established, with the maximum not exceeding 130% of the minimum. If an employee consistently works more hours, you must offer an employment contract with a higher number of hours. However, individuals eligible for the State Pension (AOW), as well as young people, high school students, and college students with part-time jobs, may continue to work under a zero-hour contract. 
• Interval in the chain provision extended: After three temporary employment contracts, there will soon be a three-year interval before you can offer another temporary employment contract. This is a significant tightening of the rules; currently, that period is still six months. Incidentally, the original proposal was five years, so the period has already been reduced. 
• Temporary workers will receive equivalent terms and conditions of employment: Temporary workers will be entitled to terms and conditions of employment that are at least equivalent to those of employees in comparable positions at the client company - and this applies to all terms and conditions of employment, not just compensation. For many staffing agencies, this is not an entirely new requirement. The Collective Labor Agreement for Temporary Workers 2026–2028 already anticipates this and includes a provision for equivalent terms and conditions of employment effective January 1, 2026. Furthermore, the temporary employment phases will be shortened from one and a half years to one year.

What now?

The bill is currently before the Senate. The Social Affairs and Employment Committee is discussing the next steps today. If the Senate also approves it, the law will largely take effect on January 1, 2028. The rules regarding equivalent employment conditions for temporary workers may take effect as early as January 1, 2027.

That may seem far off, but experience shows that adjusting contract structures and temporary staffing arrangements often takes longer than expected. That is precisely why now is a good time to critically review existing on-call contracts, temporary contracts, and temporary staffing arrangements. Are you unsure whether your contracts and working methods are future-proof? Then now is the time to have them reviewed. 

Do you have any questions about this? Please feel free to contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Noa Bilogrevic, or me.

In a previous blog post, I discussed a case in which a sick employee was observed driving, carrying bags, and even working elsewhere while on sick leave. The judge ruled that he had not been honest about his ability to work and upheld the summary dismissal: trust had been irreparably damaged.

In a recent ruling involving a sick warehouse worker who spent one evening pouring beers at a friend’s bar, the outcome was different. The employer reacted with outrage: no energy for his own work, but plenty for a lively party. The employee was summarily dismissed. The subdistrict court understood the employer’s indignation but found summary dismissal excessive in this case. The employee had since accepted the dismissal, so the employment contract was not reinstated. However, the labor court judge ruled that there was no urgent cause for dismissal and awarded fair compensation of € 10,000 gross, the transition allowance, fixed damages for failure to observe the notice period, and reimbursement for the actual legal costs incurred. All told, a total of approximately € 19,000.

The difference: honesty versus medical assessment

The first case revolved around transparency and consistency. The employee claimed he was unable to work, but his behavior suggested otherwise. The employer was justified in taking strong action precisely because reintegration can only succeed if an employee is honest about his capabilities.

In the “beer case,” the focus was on something else: whether working in a bar was medically compatible with the employee’s symptoms. That is not a matter of feeling or outrage, but in principle a medical judgment. That assessment belongs with the company doctor, not with the employer. Without that medical judgment and without first attempting a less drastic measure (such as a warning, suspension of pay, or pay freeze), summary dismissal was a step too far.

An expensive lesson for employers

The outcome: while the summary dismissal in the first case was justified, that was not the case in the beer shop case. Helping out in the pub for one evening thus became an expensive lesson for the employer.

The common thread between both rulings: in cases of illness, an employee may be expected to be as honest as possible about their ability to work. At the same time, an employer may be expected to refer medical questions to the company doctor and reserve the most severe sanction for exceptional cases.

Questions about summary dismissal during illness? Please contact Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, Noa Bilogrević, or me.

You can read the previous blog here and the ruling here.

If a building plan has been submitted to the municipality, minor changes can often still be made at a later date. It is important that these changes be of a minor nature. In other words, the entire design is not intended to be altered.

This often leads to a discussion about when an adjustment can still be considered minor, and when the adjustment results in a fundamental change to the building plan.

This debate also arose in the ruling of the Gelderland District Court on April 15, 2026. The applicant submitted an application in late 2023 to construct four chalets on a recreational lot in the municipality of Nijkerk. Because the construction plan conflicted with the zoning plan, the municipal executive intended to reject the application. However, in October 2024, a revised building plan was submitted. In that plan, the position of the chalets had been changed and the layout of the plot had been modified. According to the municipal executive, the changes made meant that the applicant no longer needed an environmental permit to carry out the construction plan. Local residents disagreed. They took the matter to court.

What was important in this case is that the original application was submitted at the end of 2023—before the Environmental Act came into effect—and the amendment to the building plan was made in October 2024, when the Environmental Act was already in effect. The question that needed to be answered was which legislation should apply: the old law or the Environment Act, which has been in effect since January 1, 2024.

As a general rule, the old law remains applicable as long as the amendments to the building plan are of a minor nature. In the case of more substantial changes, the amended building plan must be regarded as a new application, and the Environment Act applies.

According to established case law, whether a change is minor must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The decisive factor in this regard is whether the plan can still be considered the same building plan.

In this case, the court ruled that the changes made to the building plan—including the relocation of the chalets and the layout of the lot—could not be considered minor. These changes altered the spatial character of the plan, meaning it is no longer the same building plan. The municipal executive therefore wrongly applied the old law. In this case, this made no difference, as the assessment framework remained the same under both the old and new laws. However, this ruling does establish a clear framework for making changes to a building plan. 

Do you have questions about amending a building plan that has already been submitted, or are you unsure whether your building plan complies with laws and regulations? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or me. 

You can read the ruling here. 

On April 22, 2026, the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State issued a notable ruling regarding the standing of third parties in administrative fine proceedings. The central issue was whether the FNV trade union was entitled to challenge a fine imposed on a transport company.

FNV had conducted an investigation into the working conditions of truck drivers. This revealed that rules regarding rest periods were being violated. FNV shared its findings with the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT) of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. ILT incorporated FNV’s findings into its own investigation and concluded that the transport company had indeed violated the rules. The minister subsequently imposed an administrative fine of € 10,500.00.

FNV wanted to be involved in the proceedings and to be able to object to the decision. However, the minister and later the court ruled that FNV was not an interested party and therefore could not challenge the fine. FNV disagreed and filed an appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division.

The Division then had to assess whether a third party can also be an interested party in a penalty decision. This is because the legislature did not include any provisions regarding the status of third parties in penalty decisions in the section of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb) containing special provisions on administrative penalties. The Division therefore assumes that the general definitional provisions of the Awb regarding interested party status (Article 1:2 Awb) also apply to penalty decisions. This means that the third party must have a sufficiently objective, current, independent, and personal interest that is directly affected by the penalty decision. If these requirements are met, the third party is an interested party in the penalty decision.

Regarding the position of FNV, the Division ruled as follows. FNV’s purpose is to advocate for the interests of employees, including truck drivers. To that end, it conducts studies, for example. In doing so, it represents a sufficiently specific collective interest. That interest is directly affected by the penalty decision against the transport company, as this may have (positive) consequences for the drivers’ working conditions. FNV therefore has an interest in the effectiveness and the amount of the penalty and can be classified as an interested party in the penalty decision.

What does this mean in practice? If the requirements of Article 1:2 of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb) are met, third parties may also be considered interested parties in a penalty decision. It is not yet clear what consequences this has for the person on whom the penalty is imposed. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division leaves this to the legislature to decide. 

Do you have questions about your position (as a third party) in an enforcement proceeding? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or me.

You can read the ruling here. 

The European Pay Transparency Directive requires employers to provide greater insight into pay structures and to actively ensure equal pay. We wrote a blog post about this just last week.

One of the requirements of this law is to establish a pay structure or a job evaluation system. To support employers in this process, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) recently published a guide on job evaluation and pay structure. This could help in setting up an objective and gender-neutral pay system—one of the mandatory components of the new law. 

Our advice: don’t wait for formal implementation, but start reviewing your compensation policy and job structure now.

Want to know more? View the guide here

Questions about this bill? Please contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Noa Bilogrevic.

Admissibility is often the first step in assessing an objection or appeal: is the objector or claimant entitled to challenge a decision, or do they lack a legitimate interest in doing so? This issue was also addressed in the judgment of the Gelderland District Court of 3 April 2026.

The facts of the case were as follows. Several owners of holiday homes in a woodland park had submitted an enforcement request to the local authority because a holiday home in the park was being permanently occupied, whereas this was not permitted under the local plan. The local authority declared the enforcement request inadmissible. In the municipality’s view, the applicants were not interested parties. The applicants lodged an objection against this decision, but this objection was also declared inadmissible. The applicants then took the matter to court.

The court then had to assess whether these individuals were interested parties. Some of the claimants were former owners. As they no longer lived in the park, they were not affected by the permanent occupation. They were therefore not interested parties.

The other claimant owned a 1/114th share of the communal woodland park. She argued that the woodland park would fall into disrepair as a result of the permanent occupation of the holiday home, that it would increase the risk of crime, and that the planning character of the woodland park would be impaired.

Although the claimant, as a co-owner of the woodland park, might be considered an interested party, the court ruled in this case that the appeal should be declared inadmissible. This was because the claimant did not suffer any significant consequences from the permanent occupation of the holiday home. Not only was her holiday home located approximately 250 metres away from the permanently occupied holiday home and did she therefore have no view of it, but the general objections raised by the claimant also did not distinguish her from others, meaning that she could not be considered an interested party.

This ruling shows that the criterion of ‘consequences of any significance’ remains decisive in determining an interest in environmental law. General concerns are insufficient to be regarded as an interested party.

Do you have any questions about your position or are you unsure whether you are an interested party in a decision? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or with me.