News

In practice, it may happen that the transfer of a property suddenly cannot go ahead because a mortgage that has never been deleted is still registered in the public registers. The reason for this is sometimes surprisingly simple: the mortgage was taken out on behalf of a company that no longer exists. As long as that registration remains in place, transfer or refinancing is effectively impossible. This raises the question of how this can be resolved so that the property can still be transferred on time, thereby avoiding a contractual penalty.

Broadly speaking, there are two possible routes. The first is to reopen the dissolved company so that liquidation can still take place and the mortgage can be canceled. However, this is a process that takes a lot of time and money and is often undesirable in practice due to the transfer deadline. The second option is to have the mortgage declared worthless, so that the registration loses its meaning and can be canceled.

In many cases, the latter route is more in line with the need to cancel the mortgage quickly, but this route also has its pitfalls. After all, the mortgage holder no longer exists, the company has been dissolved and deregistered from the Chamber of Commerce, and there is no liquidator or successor who can cooperate. Sometimes, the (sole) director has also passed away. Although the mortgage no longer has any material significance, it formally remains in place and continues to apply in relation to third parties.

From a legal perspective, this immediately raises questions. A mortgage does not automatically disappear from the register and, as long as it remains registered, it constitutes an obstacle to the transfer of the property. But how can you bring proceedings against a counterparty that no longer exists? In principle, this leads to inadmissibility and the case will not be assessed on its merits by the court. 

In practice, this problem is often solved through summary proceedings. However, before a court can declare a mortgage worthless, it is essential that the status of the mortgage is carefully investigated in advance. The mere fact that a company no longer exists does not automatically mean that the mortgage no longer has any value. In practice, it must therefore be ascertained whether there are still creditors who may have an interest in the mortgage. The manner in which the company was dissolved is also important. In the event of bankruptcy, a trustee may have been involved in the liquidation of the estate and may be able to determine whether or not there are any outstanding rights or claims. Only if this thorough investigation shows that there are no longer any entitled parties and the mortgage no longer serves any purpose can it be stated with sufficient certainty that it is indeed worthless.

What is striking is that in cases such as these, the court is prepared to look beyond the formal objections. Although procedural law does not in principle offer a solution for proceedings without an opposing party, it is recognized that strict application would lead to an undesirable and practically untenable situation.

The court therefore gives considerable weight to the factual circumstances. If it is plausible that the company has definitively ceased to exist, that there are no longer any interested parties and that the mortgage no longer has any real significance, the request for a declaration of worthlessness may be granted. Even if there is no opposing party, the court will still proceed to a substantive assessment and may declare the mortgage worthless. 

These issues are therefore a good example of the practical side of the law prevailing over the technical legal side. The court will then rule that your request is inadmissible, but will declare the mortgage worthless. In this way, you can still deliver the property on time without incurring unpleasant penalties. 

Do you need help canceling a mortgage? Please contact Lennart Hordijk or Erwin den Hartog.

It's so easy: an employee gets a one-year contract, the year is over, and you simply extend it “one more time.” Practical, flexible, and everyone can continue. However, in labor law, “one more time” is not endless, not even for people of retirement age. The chain provision determines how often and for how long temporary employment contracts may follow each other. And if you exceed the maximum term or the maximum number of contracts, the temporary nature of the contract automatically changes into something you may not have intended: a permanent employment contract.

That is exactly what is happening in this case. The employee had been working for the employer since October 5, 2016 (after reaching retirement age) and was always given a fixed-term employment contract for one year. The last contract expired on July 31, 2025. After that, the employer assumed that the employment relationship would “simply” end due to the expiry of the term. The employee was no longer scheduled to work, did not work anymore, and was no longer paid.

The employee raised the alarm, and due to the chain provision, a permanent employment contract has now been created. After all, nine years had passed! Although the ruling does not mention this, an exception to the standard chain provision (three contracts and a maximum of three years) applies to employees who are eligible for state pension, namely a maximum of six contracts for a maximum of four years. And what the employer is doing now has nothing to do with a “termination by operation of law,” but is a termination. The employee is claiming fair compensation because, in his opinion, the termination is contrary to the law.

The subdistrict court judge goes back to basics: is this still a fixed-term employment contract, or has the chain provision resulted in a permanent employment contract? The employee points out that he has been receiving annual contracts for years. The employer even acknowledges that the chain provision would “in principle” mean that a permanent employment contract has now been created.

However, the employer then tries to find a way out via sector rules. This case concerns education: the employee was a teacher in the International Transition Class and was not formally qualified to teach. The employer argues that the Secondary Education Act 2020 and the collective labor agreement VO 2024-2025 stipulate that unqualified teachers cannot be employed on the basis of a permanent employment contract. In other words: “Yes, chain provision, but in our case that is not actually possible.”

The subdistrict court judge did not agree. According to the subdistrict court judge, the chain provision is an essential labor law protection rule (and is also included in the collective labor agreement). That rule cannot be set aside by an industry provision that is primarily concerned with optimizing the quality of education. The message is clear: it is up to the employer to apply the rules in such a way that they are complied with. If this is not properly organized, it cannot be passed on to the employee.

Because the employer gave notice, stopped providing work and paying wages after July 31, 2025, and the employee stopped performing work, the subdistrict court ruled that this constituted termination. Because this termination was in violation of the law, it is unlawful and the employee is entitled to fair compensation, which the subdistrict court judge set at € 15,000 gross, slightly more than five months' salary including vacation pay. This is how long the employment contract would have continued if it had not been unlawfully terminated.

Think of the chain provision as a kitchen timer: if it runs too long, “temporary” automatically changes to “permanent,” and that realization often comes at the most expensive moment.

Finally, the bill “more security for flex workers” is still under consideration. One of the proposed changes concerns the chain provision. If the bill is passed, the interval between successive employment contracts will be extended from 6 months to 5 years. Something to keep an eye on.

Do you have any questions? Please contact Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Dennis Oud.

You can read the ruling here.

For many municipalities, finding housing for migrant workers is a topical issue. Housing policies are increasingly being drawn up that regulate and often restrict the letting of rooms and the housing of migrant workers. These restrictions in particular are a regular topic of discussion. This was also the case in a ruling by the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State on December 10, 2025.

This case revolved around the ‘Halderberge 2021 Umbrella Plan’. With this plan, the Halderberge municipal council sought to regulate the housing of migrant workers and seasonal workers and prevent them from settling in residential areas or recreational facilities through room rentals. For this reason, the plan included a ban on room rentals, but also two exceptions, one of which related to seasonal workers and the other a general exception for room rentals.

The discussion in these proceedings revolved around the question of whether the Umbrella Plan was compatible with Article 15 of the Services Directive. More specifically, the question was whether the plan rules were discriminatory. The Division ruled that the problem did not lie in the existence of a ban on room rental per se, but in the fact that the municipality had set up a specific exemption route to allow the accommodation of seasonal workers.

Although the term “seasonal worker” sounds neutral, the assessment framework for the Umbrella Plan showed that it mainly concerns migrant workers from EU countries, particularly Central and Eastern Europe. The municipal council has also acknowledged this. Based on established case law of the Court of Justice, the Division rules here that the plan rules are indirectly discriminatory. According to the Division, it is difficult to explain why renting rooms to a seasonal worker would be different from renting rooms to a Dutch citizen, which gives it a discriminatory character.

Do you have a question about room-by-room rentals and/or housing for migrant workers? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman.

You can read the ruling here. 

You hire someone. The probationary period goes well. And then... after a few months, things go wrong: complaints, absenteeism, long-term incapacity for work. That one thought quickly pops into your head: “Wait a minute... didn't this employee already know this before he started working for us?”

In a recent ruling by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, an employer tried to capitalize on that very thought by seeking to have the employment contract annulled out of court on the grounds of error. The employer also claimed back the wages paid during the period of illness. The court did not agree.

What happened?

The employee was hired as a mechanic. After some time, he began calling in sick frequently and eventually took a long-term leave of absence. The employer then claimed that when the employee entered into the employment contract, he knew or should have known that his health condition was such that it would severely and permanently limit his ability to work. According to the employer, the employee wrongfully concealed this information, which meant that the employment contract was voidable on the grounds of error. 

The employee contested this. 

Ultimately, the Court ruled that error is possible in employment matters, but that the employer must be able to demonstrate that:

1. the employee had information about his health when entering into the contract, and;
2. he knew or should have known that this would significantly and permanently hinder him in the agreed  position, and;
3. he should therefore have informed the employer.

And all of these points went wrong. The employee did have a history of complaints and examinations, but the diagnosis (a rare and chronic condition) only came later, after he had started working for his employer. Moreover, prior to starting work and for months afterwards, he had been doing physical work and had even performed well during his probationary period. No long-term treatment or rehabilitation program had been started prior to his employment. This made it difficult to say in retrospect: “You already knew at the time that the position of mechanic would not work out.”

The court ultimately ruled that the employer's claim of error was unsuccessful and that the employment contract could not be terminated out of court and therefore remained in force. As a result, the employee retained his entitlement to (back) pay. In addition, the employer had to pay the statutory increase on top of the back pay (the Court increased this to the full 50% instead of the more moderate 20% previously set by the subdistrict court) and the employer was also liable for the legal costs. In short: error sounds simple, but it can be costly. 

If you have any questions about incapacity for work, reintegration, or dismissal, please contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, or Elke Hofman.

The full judgments can be read here.

When an employment relationship is under severe strain and can no longer be repaired, going to the subdistrict court is the obvious course of action. However, this recent ruling by the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal on December 1, 2025, shows once again that as long as an employee is sick, the door to dismissal rarely opens.

In this case, the employer attempted to terminate the employment contract on several grounds: poor performance, a disrupted working relationship, and a combination of grounds. The problem was that the employee was already ill at the time the petition was filed. This meant that the prohibition on termination during illness applied. The court can still terminate the employment contract, but only if the facts and circumstances cited for the dismissal are completely unrelated (abstract) to the illness.

The court was clear:

• The alleged shortcomings in performance were insufficiently substantiated.
• There was also no completed performance review file prior to the sick leave notification.
• The disruption of the employment relationship only seemed to escalate after the sick leave notification, partly due to conversations that took place during the sick leave. This is also evident from a report by the company doctor.

As a result, the grounds for dismissal could not be completely separated from the illness.

The result: termination is not possible and the employee must be reintegrated with the employer. The court does see problems with this and recommends that mediation talks should still take place during the first stage of reintegration and/or that the focus should be on the second stage.  

What does this mean for employers?

1. Be extremely careful when dismissing employees who are ill. 
2. Start a file in good time, before illness becomes an issue, or involve the company doctor in the advice to implement an improvement program.
3. Make it clear that any poor performance, culpable conduct, or disrupted working relationship has nothing to do with the employee's incapacity for work. Check this with the company doctor.
4. Be aware that the court will apply strict criteria when assessing a prohibition of dismissal due to illness.

Questions about the reintegration or improvement process for an employee? Please contact Elke Hofman, Dennis Oud or with Tessa Sipkema. 

You can read the ruling here.

This week, the Supreme Court published two interesting judgments that are important for employers. Both cases focus on the protection of employees, but the judgments provide clear guidance on the extent of that protection and where the limits lie.

Exclusion of previous years of service from transition allowance

In the Deme Offshore case, the Supreme Court ruled that previous employment relationships that were terminated by the employee themselves do not count towards the calculation of the transition allowance in the event of subsequent dismissal. The statutory ‘aggregation rule’ only applies if the initiative to terminate the previous employment relationship lay with the employer. This is important because the law can also be interpreted differently, namely that if the employment contract is terminated and re-entered within a period of six months, the employment relationship must always be regarded as a continuous employment relationship and therefore also counts towards the calculation of the transition allowance. The Supreme Court therefore ruled that this is not the case.

Invoking working hours despite rejecting an offer

In the Taxiwerq case, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee can also invoke the legal presumption of working hours (Section 7:610b of the Dutch Civil Code) with retroactive effect, even if he has previously rejected the legally required offer of fixed hours. The rules in Articles 7:628a and 7:610b of the Dutch Civil Code are separate from each other, and the protection afforded by the legal presumption therefore remains in force.

What can employers learn from this?

• Bear in mind that not every year of service counts toward the transition payment, particularly if the employee has previously resigned.
• An employee who refuses an offer of fixed hours may still claim wages (for the same period) based on actual hours worked. Therefore, ensure careful communication and record-keeping, and try to keep the flexible “zero-hour” pool as low as possible.   

If you have any questions about the ruling, please contact Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman, or Dennis Oud.

 You can read the full judgments here:

Deme Offshore judgment

Taxiwerq judgment