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After two years of illness, it sometimes seems as if a case has been closed. However, in the case of a dormant employment contract, this turns out to be different in practice.

In a recent case in Rotterdam, the employee had been incapacitated for work for two years as of July 27, 2025. From that moment on, she received WIA benefits. The employer then attempted to terminate the employment contract retroactively by letter dated August 21, 2025. This is not legally possible. The termination therefore only took effect when the letter reached the employee: August 21, 2025. 

Between July 27, 2025, and August 21, 2025, there was therefore a dormant employment relationship: the employment contract continued to run, but without pay and without reintegration obligations. The employee then argued that she had accrued vacation days during that period and that these should therefore be paid out.

Opinions on this question currently differ. There have been rulings by subdistrict courts in Nijmegen, Arnhem, Groningen, Dordrecht, and Rotterdam, and there is no clear line in the literature either. The subdistrict court therefore wishes to refer a question to the Supreme Court for a preliminary ruling. In plain language: the highest court is being asked to clarify whether an employee who is unable to work still accrues paid vacation days during a dormant employment contract.

Why is this relevant? A dormant employment relationship often arises automatically, simply because dismissal proceedings via the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) take time and are followed by a notice period. In addition, some employment relationships continue for longer, for example until an employee requests termination.

In this case, the parties may first comment on the intention to submit this question to the Supreme Court. There is therefore a real chance that national clarity will finally be provided on this issue in due course.

We will keep an eye on developments and notify you when there is more news.

You can read the ruling here. 

On Saturday, February 28, our sponsored fighter Dave Kientz participated in the IFK Dutch Open at the Topsportcentrum Rotterdam!👊

After three strong matches, Dave convincingly secured victory and finished in an impressive 1st place in the men's -70 kg class. A great start to the new season, which we as proud sponsors are delighted to see! It promises to be a great sporting year, because on March 21, Dave already has the next big tournament on his agenda: the Western European Championships.

We congratulate Dave on this wonderful result and look forward to the next matches. Good luck with the preparations!

Construction initiatives often involve various parties. The initiator, the contractor, and any future owners or tenants all have an interest in ensuring that the preparatory work and final realization proceed smoothly. The permit process is an essential part of this. If an environmental permit is subsequently refused, all these different parties will therefore also benefit from blocking that decision.

This was also the case in the ruling of the Zeeland-West-Brabant District Court of February 9, 2026. In 2011, the mayor and aldermen of the municipality of Veere had already granted an environmental permit for the construction of a hotel. However, in 2021, the permit was revoked because it had not been used in all those years. An objection to that decision was lodged by the owner of the plot, the contractor, a construction company, and various parties involved in the construction of the hotel. A group of residents also appealed against the decision on the objection, in which the objections were declared unfounded.

So there were many different parties, all with varying interests. The court therefore first had to assess which appeals were admissible and which were not.

To do so, it first had to consider the interest in bringing proceedings. This means that the appeal could achieve a result of factual significance for the appellant. In other words: does the appellant have anything to gain from lodging the appeal? In this case, the court ruled that all parties had an interest in bringing proceedings.

Next, the court had to consider the parties' interest in the proceedings. Only those whose interests are directly affected by a decision can lodge an objection and/or appeal against it. The court ruled as follows on this matter.

Regarding the appeals of the various parties involved in the development of the hotel and the contractor and construction company, the court ruled that they had no direct interest in the decision, but only a derivative interest. They were only indirectly affected in their interests. That interest was dependent on contractual relationships, such as a purchase or contract agreement. These appeals were therefore also declared inadmissible.

The court ruled that residents living approximately 20 meters from the project are interested parties because they may experience significant consequences from the project. Residents living further away will not experience any significant consequences and were therefore not qualified as interested parties. The appeal of the latter group was therefore declared inadmissible. 

What does this mean in practice? Only parties whose interests are directly affected by a decision are interested parties and may lodge an objection and/or appeal, as long as they have a legal interest. The fact that a party's interests may be indirectly affected by a decision does not make that party an interested party. 

Do you have any questions about the admissibility of an objection or appeal? Please feel free to contact Gerard van der Wende or with Fleur Huisman. 

You can read the ruling here. 

On February 25, 2026, the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State issued an interesting ruling on whether housing for migrant workers falls under accommodation or residence. This is a topical issue that many employers with international employees have to deal with.

The ruling concerned the construction of accommodation units with a service building for the housing of migrant workers. The initiator had submitted a permit application for this purpose. The permit application was rejected by the municipal executive because the building plan was deemed to be in conflict with the zoning plan and the Building Decree.

According to the municipal executive, the accommodation units did not fall under the permitted accommodation function, but would have a residential function. The construction drawings indicated residential use, because all units had their own entrance and shared kitchen, bathroom facilities, and living room, and were therefore suitable for habitation. The fact that the application explained that the accommodation was for stays of 3 to a maximum of 6 months by persons whose main residence was elsewhere and that a night register was kept for this purpose did not alter this, according to the municipal executive. Because the council believes that this is residential use, the requirements of the Building Decree would also not be met, as different requirements apply to residential use than to lodging.

The Division disagreed with the council. It ruled that, in view of the application and the additional information provided about the use, the units are being used for accommodation in the sense of overnight stays, and not for residential purposes. Providing accommodation is in line with the zoning plan.

Regarding the possibility that the units will be used for residential purposes rather than accommodation, the Division ruled that the fact that the units may be suitable for habitation does not mean that it must be assumed that the environmental permit will actually be applied for for unauthorized residential use.

The Division therefore considers that the council had insufficient grounds to base its refusal of the permit application on an unauthorized intended use for residential purposes. If the accommodation units are in fact used for residential purposes in practice, this is a matter of enforcement, but that is not relevant in the permit procedure.

What can we conclude from this ruling? In a permit procedure concerning the housing of migrant workers, the intended use (for lodging) must be taken as a basis, and not any possible illegal use (for residential purposes) that might also be possible. That is a matter of enforcement.

Do you have questions about housing migrant workers and the requirements that apply? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman. 

You can read the ruling here. 

What can you do as an employer if an employee refuses to cooperate with their reintegration? This recent ruling shows that termination is ultimately possible, provided you follow the process carefully.

For employers and HR, this is a clear reminder: termination is possible, but only if you handle it carefully. The court explicitly states what is required in any case:

• a written warning or wage measure,
• and an expert opinion from the UWV (Employee Insurance Agency) showing that the employee is not cooperating sufficiently.

In this case, the employer had issued several warnings, first suspending the employee's wages and then terminating them. In the meantime, the employee had attended two consultations with the company doctor. The company doctor indicated that reintegration into (suitable) work was not yet possible, but that regular contact between the employer and the employee could be expected. Also known as ‘a cup of coffee with the employer’.

However, the employee did not respond to the employer's invitations, despite the warnings and the suspension of wages. An expert opinion was then requested. The UWV ruled that the employee was not cooperating sufficiently with his reintegration. The subdistrict court agreed.

However, the employee did not respond to the employer's invitations, despite warnings and the suspension of wages. An expert opinion was then requested. The UWV ruled that the employee was not cooperating sufficiently with his reintegration. The subdistrict court agreed with this ruling.

What is striking about this ruling is that the UWV's expert opinion was issued relatively quickly. The exact date of the request is not stated in the ruling, but it cannot have taken longer than about six weeks. The UWV can therefore act swiftly when necessary. The court proceedings did take longer, however. The request was submitted in November, the ruling followed in February, and the employment contract does not end until April 1, 2026. 

This means that, as an employer, you should take into account a processing time of several months. 

It is also striking that nothing is said about the transition allowance. Because there is no serious culpable conduct, the employee may still be entitled to a transition allowance.

The most important lesson for employers and HR: make sure you have a solid case file. Put everything in writing, apply wage measures correctly, and request an expert opinion in good time. Without these steps, termination on these grounds is virtually impossible.

Questions about a stalled reintegration process? Please contact Dennis Oud, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Tessa Sipkema.

You can read the ruling here. 

Employers like clarity. Study cost clauses too. But on 5 February 2026, the subdistrict court in East Brabant showed that this clarity quickly disappears when training is classified as “necessary” within the meaning of the law. In this case, the study cost clauses were simply declared null and void. As a result, the employee did not have to repay any study costs, even though she had resigned of her own accord and had even requested one of the courses.

The case involved Teamzorg, a home care organisation. An employee was hired as a trainee care assistant and followed the Care Assistant training programme (followed by the Plus certificate) at the Zorgcollege in Nijmegen. She then started the follow-up course to become a Care Assistant, but did not complete it. When she left the company, the employer wanted to recover an amount for both courses on the basis of the study cost clauses. The employee defended herself with an argument that is now well known but still underestimated in practice: if training is necessary for the job, the employer must offer that training free of charge and cannot recover the costs. The court ruled in her favour.

What made the judge classify these courses under Section 7:611a of the Civil Code? In the case of the Care Assistant course, it was actually quite clear. The judge considered it particularly important that this course was necessary in order to perform the job at Teamzorg. Teamzorg itself stated that every employee must have “a basic qualification in care on paper”. The job advertisement literally stated: a Care Assistant diploma is required (or you must be willing to obtain one). So if, as an employer, you effectively say, “without this diploma, you cannot do your job here”, then it quickly falls under the category of necessary training.

The Plus certificate was rejected for the same reason. It was not seen as a nice bonus, but as something that is necessary in order to be able to perform certain skills independently within the job. The judge saw it as a logical extension of the training programme.

The biggest discussion was about the follow-up training for IG Caregivers. Here too, the court ruled that it was necessary training. The context was particularly decisive. The parties entered into a training/employment contract for the position of IG Caregiver apprentice, which, according to the court, shows that Teamzorg wanted to employ her in that role (in the long term). In addition, there were structural vacancies for nursing assistants and Teamzorg confirmed that the employee was performing well and had opportunities for advancement. The judge linked this to a clear employer interest: retaining a good employee and broader employability.

Salient detail: Teamzorg actively directed where the training had to be followed. The employee wanted the cheaper ROC, but the employer wanted the Zorgcollege because the training could be completed more quickly there and Teamzorg was facing a staff shortage. That direction actually worked against Teamzorg. The court ruled that if the employer has a say in the choice of training provider and pace of training because it suits them, this shows that it is not just a matter of “personal development”, but also serves a direct business interest.

The judge did not consider the fact that the initiative came from the employee to be decisive. “Voluntary” is therefore not a free pass if, in practice, the training is (also) in the employer's interest and is linked to employability.

What does this mean for employers who do want to work with study cost clauses? Take a good look at the actual context. If the training is necessary for the job, if the employer requires the diploma as a basis, if you enter into a training/employment contract for a (different) job, if there is a structural need for that commitment, and certainly if you, as an employer, dictate the training provider and pace because you want to make use of the employee's new skills more quickly, it will soon become difficult to reclaim the costs later.

Do you have any questions about study cost arrangements? Please feel free to contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema or Elke Hofman-Bijvank. 

You can read the ruling here.