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For three decades, we have been committed to representing our clients' interests, quality, and a personal approach, with an eye for both the legal framework and the people behind it. 

Today, we celebrated this special anniversary together at the office. With a delicious cake, champagne, and a beautiful bronze statue that all employees had specially made for this moment, we reflected on what has been built up over all these years.

It was especially nice to have Hans de Haij, our former colleague and friend, who is now retired, but was of course part of this milestone today.🥳

It was special to celebrate this with everyone from the office. We are proud of where we come from and look forward with confidence to everything that is yet to come! 

In a ruling dated 14 January 2026, the subdistrict court judge was presented with a considerable number of complaints from an employee about her employer. An employee of a local authority suffered from burnout, later contracted Covid-19 and developed long Covid. The Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) awarded her a WIA benefit (80–100%) and the local authority ultimately terminated her employment contract after two years due to long-term incapacity for work. The employee felt that the local authority had played a significant role in the cause of her incapacity for work and that the local authority had acted in a seriously culpable manner before, during and after the reintegration process. Her request included fair compensation of € 130,000 and various wage and cost items.

The subdistrict court judge immediately set the tone: the bar for fair compensation in situations like this is high. Very high. Not only must there be seriously culpable acts or omissions, but also a causal link between those acts and the termination. In other words, “it wasn't perfect” is not the same as “this is so serious that it justifies fair compensation.

Before the absence, the main issue was work pressure. According to the subdistrict court, this was plausibly high, but that does not automatically constitute grounds for “serious culpability”. It is relevant that, following a memo in which the work pressure was raised, the municipality immediately scheduled a meeting, engaged an external absenteeism counsellor and arranged extra support for the team. The employee claimed that this was all insufficient, but according to the subdistrict court, it was not made sufficiently clear that the employee subsequently indicated that the measures were inadequate or that she had requested more help. Without the employer knowing (or having to know) that things were really going wrong, it is difficult to say afterwards: ‘you knowingly did nothing’.

In addition, the subdistrict court also looks at what was going on outside of work. The documents show that the burnout is not only linked to work factors; non-work-related causes are also mentioned. There was also a second opinion from a company doctor who felt that a report to the Dutch Centre for Occupational Diseases was justified, and ultimately that report was made. However, the magistrate emphasises that this second opinion is based on information provided by the employee, which the municipality disputed, and therefore does not accept this opinion “without further ado”. The result: it cannot be established that the burnout was caused by seriously culpable conduct on the part of the municipality. The judge therefore does not address the question of whether the burnout made the employee more susceptible to long COVID.

The magistrate is critical of the reintegration process, and to be fair, the municipality deserves some criticism in this regard. Responses were not always prompt, agreements were not always honoured, and contact was not constant (there was even a period of five months without contact, which the municipality did not dispute). It also took a long time for the medical file to be transferred when the company doctor changed. That does not sound like a tightly organised reintegration process, but rather like “where is that file again?”. But even this does not reach the threshold of serious culpability. Moreover, according to the subdistrict court, the necessary causal link with the dismissal is missing, because the medical assessments repeatedly showed that there were no usable options. The UWV stated that no reintegration opportunities had been missed and that the municipality had made sufficient efforts.

The employee also invoked incapacity for work "in and through the service" (an article in the Municipalities Collective Labour Agreement that, among other things, entitles the employee to a supplement to the WIA), but this also failed. According to the subdistrict court, there was insufficient evidence that the working conditions were objectively excessive; high work pressure alone is not sufficient for this.

The council is largely correct in terms of content, but there are a few issues with wages where things go wrong and the magistrate is less lenient. In May 2024, the employee was underpaid due to an error in the settlement with the WIA benefit. This was later rectified with a net additional payment of € 1,658.58. Because this was done too late, the municipality also has to pay a (moderate) statutory increase of € 340.01 net and statutory interest on € 1,658.58 for the period from 17 May 2024 to 20 June 2024.

The subdistrict court also ruled that the municipality had wrongfully deducted amounts from the IKB in November and December 2024. The municipality must therefore pay € 1,366.98 gross in back pay, plus a statutory increase (moderate to 25%) and statutory interest.

Not everything is awarded. The pension contributions withheld do not have to be refunded and the costs of the mindfulness training are not reimbursed, because this was not prescribed by the company doctor and was not agreed in advance with the local authority.

This ruling shows that the threshold for seriously culpable conduct in the event of dismissal after long-term incapacity for work remains high, even if the reintegration process does not run smoothly. At the same time, it shows how quickly an error in payroll accounting or an incorrect deduction can lead to additional costs (statutory increase and interest). So, even if the legal course of action is perfectly in order, if the payslip goes haywire, you will still have to pay. 

Do you have any questions about long-term absenteeism and reintegration files? Please contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema or Elke Hofman-Bijvank.

You can read the ruling here. 

It is a common misconception that citizens or companies can object to and/or appeal against every decision made by an administrative body. In practice, this often leads to confusion and misunderstanding.

In its ruling of January 12, 2026, the Midden-Nederland District Court clarified why objections and appeals are not always possible. The ruling concerned the following. The municipal council of Zeist approved a decision in principle to redevelop an office location into a residential area. At the same time, the council adopted an amendment setting out the level of participation for the further elaboration of the plan.

The Better Zeist Foundation disagreed with the amendment because it considered the level of participation to be too low, which would limit its influence on the planning process. The foundation therefore lodged an objection to the amendment. The municipal council declared the objection inadmissible because, in its view, no objection could be lodged against the amendment. The foundation then lodged an appeal.

The ruling first explains the concept of a decision as defined in the General Administrative Law Act (Awb). A decision is a written decision by an administrative body that constitutes a legal act under public law. The latter point is particularly important. A legal act must be aimed at a legal effect: it must create, change, or terminate rights, obligations, or powers, or determine the legal status of a person or matter.

Not every choice made by an administrative body is therefore a decision within the meaning of the Awb. If the choice has no legal effect, it cannot be qualified as a decision.

The court ruled that the amendment was not a decision. This is because the amendment does not change the rights or obligations of citizens, does not grant or withdraw powers, and only contains a political-administrative choice about how participation in a preliminary phase is organized. The actual legal consequences will only arise later, when the environmental plan is adopted, which is open to appeal. The appeal was therefore declared unfounded.

Value was therefore attached to the phase of the process to which the amendment related. As this concerned a choice for the preliminary phase, there were no legal consequences as yet. According to the court, these would only arise at a later stage, when the environmental plan was adopted.

What does this mean in practice? Citizens and businesses cannot seek legal remedies at any stage of the decision-making process. In most cases, they must wait for the “final decision.” 

Are you wondering at which stage of a decision-making process an objection or appeal is possible? Or do you encounter similar questions in practice? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman for advice. 

You can read the ruling here. 

A recent ruling by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal on Uber shows that the Deliveroo framework remains the basis, but that the outcome can change if “entrepreneurship” is firmly and concretely substantiated.

As in Deliveroo, the court bases its ruling on Section 7:610 of the Dutch Civil Code and the well-known principles: you determine whether someone is an employee by weighing up all the circumstances together, without a fixed order of priority. In an earlier interim judgment, the court had already ruled in general terms that the elements pointing towards an employment contract outweigh the contraindications, but that (external) entrepreneurship could tip the balance.

Since the Supreme Court ruling in 2025, one point has become particularly clear: entrepreneurship (point ix from Deliveroo) is not “by nature” more important than other circumstances, but it can make a difference in the overall assessment. As a result, the court in this case must also consider circumstances that do not relate exclusively to the platform relationship. In practice, questions such as the following often arise: does the person make substantial investments (e.g. in a car), does the person have multiple clients, does the person recruit their own customers, what is their tax position, and does the person really bear the costs and risks?

The court applies this in concrete terms in this case. The trade union demanded (in summary) a declaration that all drivers are employees and that the Taxi Transport Collective Labour Agreement therefore applies, with the associated allowances. However, for the drivers who are the focus of these proceedings, the court concludes that there is no employment contract because their entrepreneurship is strongly substantiated. The court cites, among other things: substantial investments (such as the car), freedom in working hours, their own strategy for accepting/refusing rides and associated earnings, and risks of liability and incapacity for work.
 
At the same time, the court does not rule out the possibility that there may be individual drivers who should be regarded as employees. However, due to a lack of sufficient concrete data on individual circumstances, the court was unable to identify individual drivers or clearly defined groups to whom this would apply. As a result, no general judgement can be given on the compensation claimed.

In short: Deliveroo remains the benchmark, but this ruling shows that well-documented entrepreneurship can really tip the balance and that broad, general claims without hard facts about (groups of) drivers are more likely to fail.
 
If you have any questions about your self-employed contracts, please contact Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank or Dennis Oud.

You can read the ruling here.

Many municipalities have a reactive enforcement policy. This means that, in general, enforcement only takes place in response to a report or enforcement request from a third party (interested party). This is because municipalities often simply do not have the capacity to actively ‘search’ for violations. But what if the report is not made by a third party (interested party), but by a civil servant?

That was the question that the Overijssel District Court had to answer in its ruling of January 12, 2026. This case concerned a house in the municipality of Hengelo, where several air conditioners had been installed on the outside of the house. Following a report from a municipal employee, a municipal inspector carried out an inspection and found that an environmental permit should have been applied for two of the air conditioners. This had not been done. A penalty was then imposed. The owner of the house disagreed with this. He believed that this was contrary to the principle of equality, because the municipality had deviated from its own reactive enforcement policy by enforcing the law in response to a report from a civil servant.

The court first of all states that, based on the principle of equality, a consistent and well-considered administrative policy must be pursued. The administration must follow a general course of action with regard to its actions in individual similar cases. It is established case law of the Division that it is permissible to set priorities in the context of enforcement policy with a view to effective enforcement. For example, prioritization may mean that certain violations are only enforced in response to a complaint or an enforcement request from an interested party.

In this case, the decisive factor is that the report was made by a municipal employee who could not be regarded as an interested party. The court did not agree with the board's assertion that it does not matter who makes the report, even if it is a municipal employee. The court ruled that the council's policy can only be interpreted as meaning that enforcement requests or reports must come from third parties with an interest. Municipal employees should not be included in this, because this would still give the council control over whether and when it takes enforcement action. This could create the appearance of arbitrariness.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this ruling is that, in principle, the municipality only acts on the basis of reports and requests from third parties. A report from a civil servant may not lead to an inspection, because the municipal executive can still decide for itself when to enforce the law. 

Do you have any questions about an enforcement request or enforcement procedure? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman. 

You can read the ruling here.

A recent ruling by the subdistrict court in Utrecht clearly illustrates this once again. An employee joined a biotech start-up that focuses on developing cancer therapies as a researcher. On her first day at work, she announced that she was pregnant. Two days later (after the weekend), she was dismissed during her probationary period. According to the employer, this was due to sudden financial setbacks.

That story did not hold up.

Less than ten days later, a vacancy for exactly the same position appeared. And not much later, another researcher was actually hired. It is remarkable that the financial situation would suddenly improve within such a short period of time. The subdistrict court therefore did not consider the employer's stated reason to be plausible. The employer's conduct could only lead to the conclusion that the pregnancy was the reason for the dismissal during the probationary period. The defense that the employer was unaware of the pregnancy was also rejected: a direct supervisor did know about it, and that knowledge is attributed to the employer.

The bottom line: yes, an employment contract may be terminated during the probationary period. In principle, a financial reason is a valid reason for dismissal during the probationary period. However, this does not apply if the real reason is discriminatory. Pregnancy is direct discrimination on the basis of gender. 

The result? The dismissal during the probationary period was not legally valid and was overturned. The employment contract continued, with the right to wages. The statutory increase was also awarded, moderated to 25%, plus statutory interest. In practice, this can result in wages being owed for a period during which hardly any work was done. The employee did not actually have to work a single day for this: the ruling dates from December 29 and she was due to give birth in January. Maternity leave had probably already started by then. Non-material damages were rejected because it had not been established that she had suffered mental injury.

This ruling is a clear warning to employers: any appeal to financial reasons must be consistent and credible. More importantly, pregnancy must never, even implicitly, play a role in dismissal, not even during the probationary period.

A link to the ruling can be found here.

Do you have questions about the probationary period or the dismissal of an employee? Please contact Dennis Oud, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Tessa Sipkema.