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Last week, the Advisory Division of the Council of State published its opinion on the bill to implement the European Directive on pay transparency between men and women.

To recap the rationale behind this directive: to increase transparency regarding pay and pay policies, and to make unjustified pay gaps between men and women more visible and easier to address. The bill includes provisions on access to pay criteria, employees’ requests for information, and reporting obligations for employers (with more than 100 employees). So there is work to be done.

The Council of State is critical of the feasibility of the proposal, particularly for employers. The advisory opinion emphasizes that the proposal imposes significant administrative burdens and additional obligations on employers.

Furthermore, the Council of State raises questions about the chosen implementation approach. For instance, the Division asks why the option of having the government centrally handle part of the payroll reporting was not utilized, as this could have potentially reduced the administrative burden on employers. It also requests further clarification on, among other things, the unfeasible implementation deadline of June 7, 2026, and whether this will affect the first reporting dates. In addition, privacy issues remain, and the Division recommends providing clarity on whether, and if so, how employers must include the compensation of non-binary individuals when complying with the proposal’s obligations.

The Council of State’s message is clear: the government will need to provide further justification and clarification on several points of this bill before the process can move forward. This is relevant for employers because the practical impact of this law is not yet fully determined or clear in all respects.

Employers would be wise to, at a minimum:

• Adjust the hiring process where necessary: provide clarity on the salary range prior to the compensation discussion and stop asking about previous salary(ies);
• Ensure that job profiles or descriptions are up to date;
• Establish and/or review a job evaluation system. Determine which positions can be placed in the same category.
• Place the categories on the salary scale and determine the ranges for those categories.
• Check for any unjustified pay gaps between men and women in the same category and resolve these as much as possible.

Read the Council of State's opinion here. 

Do you have any questions about this bill? Please contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Noa Bilogrevic.

How far does the principle of legitimate expectations extend? It is a question that has often been debated in case law, but one that still raises many questions.

This was also the case in the ruling of the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State on 1 April 2026. This case concerns a care provider who has been running a care farm for a long time and wishes to expand his activities to include a 24-hour care facility. Over a period of four years, the council had explicitly adopted a positive position in principle on three occasions regarding a residential care centre on the site, following which the care provider submitted an application. Subsequently, the council suddenly indicated that it no longer wished to cooperate and also proposed to the council that the required declaration of no objection should not be issued. The council ultimately did not issue this declaration, partly because it believed that an acceptable living environment could not be guaranteed at the location. The planning application was therefore rejected.

The entrepreneur did not agree with this decision and invoked the principle of legitimate expectations. After all, he had received positive signals from the council for years and felt that he should have been able to rely on them.

The Division acknowledges that the healthcare provider could reasonably have expected the council to cooperate with the project. However, this does not mean that the reliance on the principle of legitimate expectations was successful. The crucial factor is, in fact, who raised those expectations. For a successful appeal to the principle of legitimate expectations, the trust must have been raised by, or be attributable to, the competent administrative body. That is where the problem lies here.

The statements were made by the council. The council is not bound by the council’s statements, unless the council endorses those statements. That was not the case here. This means that whilst the entrepreneur was entitled to rely on a positive attitude from the council, this did not automatically mean that the council would also take a positive decision. The reliance on the principle of legitimate expectations therefore failed.

This ruling once again highlights how important it is to be clear about who is making a commitment, whether that person is authorised to make a commitment on behalf of the competent administrative body, and whether, as a citizen or business, you can reasonably expect, on the basis of that commitment, that something will or will not happen.

Do you have any questions about the scope of the principle of legitimate expectations? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman.

You can read the ruling here.

As an employer, you carefully follow the company doctor’s advice during the first two years of illness. However, it is possible that the UWV’s medical examiner may later reach a different conclusion during the WIA assessment. The UWV may then determine that insufficient reintegration efforts have been made, resulting in a wage penalty (termination of the obligation to continue paying wages). This creates significant uncertainty for employers.
With the “Bill to Amend the Assessment of Reintegration Efforts and the WIA Advance Payment Scheme” (hereinafter: the bill), the government aims to eliminate this uncertainty and address the structural backlogs at the UWV. 

What does the bill contain?

The bill includes amendments related to the reintegration report assessment (RIV assessment), the waiver of improperly paid WIA advances, and a few limited changes and clarifications to the Wajong.

Reintegration Report Assessment

The most significant change for employers is that, in principle, the UWV must base its RIV assessment on the company doctor’s opinion regarding the employee’s work capacity. The insurance doctor will no longer evaluate this opinion. However, the UWV will still assess whether the employer and employee have made sufficient efforts toward reintegration in line with that advice. As a result, wage sanctions based on a medical difference of opinion between the company doctor and the insurance doctor would no longer be possible. 

Waiver of WIA Advances

Due to backlogs at the UWV, current and former employees often receive an advance payment while awaiting a decision on their WIA application. If it later turns out that there is no entitlement, or only a partial entitlement, to WIA benefits, that advance must in principle be repaid. The bill includes a temporary measure under which the advance does not have to be repaid, or only partially repaid, so that (former) employees are not later faced with substantial recovery claims as a result of the long waiting times. This measure should have no financial impact on the premiums that individual employers pay to the UWV, as the advances are charged to the Aof. 

Wajong

The bill also includes several amendments and clarifications to the Wajong (the benefit for young people with disabilities). 

What does this mean in practice?

The bill helps to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible regarding a potential wage penalty. In principle, employers who follow the company doctor’s advice and carefully implement the reintegration process are on the right track. It will still be some time before the bill actually takes effect. Until then, it is important for employers to ensure the reintegration process proceeds correctly and to critically evaluate the company doctor’s advice themselves. If you have any doubts, request an expert opinion from the UWV in a timely manner so that adjustments can be made and the risk of a wage penalty is reduced.  

Do you have questions about reintegration or about avoiding a wage penalty? We’re happy to help. Feel free to contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Noa Bilogrevic. 

View the bill and its explanatory notes here. 

Firing an employee on the spot for using ChatGPT on a work laptop? That might sound harsh, but legally, it’s not that simple. And that’s exactly where things went wrong in this case.

In this ruling by the Zeeland-West-Brabant District Court, the case involved an employee on sick leave who had, among other things, entered search queries via ChatGPT on his company laptop regarding dismissal and potential severance pay. The employer, along with other allegations, saw this as grounds for immediate dismissal. But the district court judge drew a clear line through that.

Why? Because private use of the laptop was apparently not prohibited. The employer had not indicated anywhere that this was prohibited, so the labor court judge assumed that private use of the laptop was permitted. The use of ChatGPT was therefore not automatically a misuse of company resources. Nor was it shown that confidential company information had been shared. This made this aspect, at most, a minor offense, but not serious enough to warrant immediate dismissal. 

The most important lesson for employers, however, lies elsewhere. In the termination letter, the employer had listed seven reasons without making it clear that each of those reasons could, on its own, justify immediate termination. Legally, this constitutes a composite cause for immediate termination. Consequently, all seven elements must be proven. That did not happen. As a result, the immediate termination was overturned. Sometimes, therefore, the greatest risk lies not in the behavior itself, but in how the termination letter sets the case in motion.

What can employers learn from this?

1. Formulate the grounds for dismissal very precisely and strategically;
2. make it clear that the behaviors mentioned, both individually and collectively, constitute grounds for immediate dismissal; 
3. do not list too many allegations at once unless each point can be firmly substantiated;
4. clearly define in your policies what is and is not permitted regarding company resources, including for personal use. 

Not sure whether a termination letter, IT policy, or protocol is legally sound? In that case, a quick review beforehand is often more cost-effective than litigation later on. Please feel free to contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank and Noa Bilogrevic, and for more information. 

An employee falls on his knee while at work on October 9, 2024. He reports sick shortly thereafter (on October 16 and 17), continues working for a short time, but reports sick again on November 13, 2024, and remains unable to work thereafter. In the first months of 2025, the company doctor assesses him as fully unable to work for (reintegration) activities. So far, this appears to be a “classic” sick leave case with a reintegration process.

But then, in early June 2025, the employer hears something that changes the situation: the employee is said to have briefly performed operator work at another company during his sick leave on October 16 and 17, 2024. This is particularly sensitive because, although he was permitted by the employer to work as a self-employed contractor at other companies, reporting sick while simultaneously working elsewhere naturally raises questions. The employer engages an investigative agency to look into the employee’s activities during his incapacity for work.

In July 2025, the employee tells the employer that he is not getting better, that he must rest completely, that he is unable to meet in person, and that he cannot drive. However, the investigation report shows that he has driven on multiple occasions, carried a large shopping bag, and walked without any abnormal gait. The employer requests an explanation, announces immediate termination, and gives the employee the opportunity to respond (hearing both sides of the story). The employee is summarily dismissed.

The employee requests that the dismissal be overturned. He argues that he is genuinely ill, is undergoing treatment, and that an employer cannot determine his medical condition or whether he is ill based on an observation report. That determination is reserved for the company physician. It is only during the hearing that an explanation emerges: he claims he drove because his father had to go to the hospital and he needed to translate, and later because he had to go to BioZorg for an appointment related to his return-to-work program. He says he took painkillers and oxazepam for this. He also acknowledges that he worked for two days at another company, but that he did not know this was not permitted while on sick leave.

The subdistrict court upholds the summary dismissal. Not because the judge says the employee is not sick, but because the core issue here revolves around trust and honesty regarding work capacity. An employer must be able to rely on a (sick) employee to communicate openly and truthfully. The judge noted, among other things, that it is difficult to reconcile the fact that a home visit was “not possible” while driving and attending appointments were feasible, that no explanation was provided for the normal walking behavior that was observed, and that the use of heavy medication directly contradicts the claim that he was able to drive while taking it. Since no plausible explanation was provided, the employer was entitled to conclude that trust had been irreparably damaged.

And then there is the remarkable conclusion: despite the legally valid summary dismissal, the labor court judge nevertheless awards a transition payment. Normally, such compensation is not payable in the case of a justified summary dismissal, but here, due to the circumstances (still fully incapacitated for work, sole breadwinner, seven years of service, and no prior incidents), € 12,202.10 gross was nevertheless awarded pursuant to Article 7:673(8) of the Dutch Civil Code (with interest accruing fourteen days after the decision). 

This ruling demonstrates how quickly a disrupted relationship of trust during illness can escalate and how seriously the court views consistent, transparent communication regarding work capacity.

You can read the ruling here. 

An employee calls in sick while staying abroad. Can the employer then require the employee to return to the Netherlands for an examination by the company doctor? And what if the employee refuses?

A recent ruling shows that, under certain circumstances, an employer may indeed require an employee to return to the Netherlands for an examination by the company doctor. If the employee refuses to cooperate, a suspension of pay may be justified.

In this case, an employee traveled to Portugal due to a family emergency. His dog, which was staying with his mother, was dying and could no longer be cared for by his mother. One day after his dog’s death, the employee reported sick with physical and psychological symptoms. The employee sent the employer a “certificate of temporary incapacity,” stating that he was temporarily unable to travel. The company doctor in the Netherlands saw things differently. According to the company doctor, there was no medical restriction on travel, and it was necessary for the employee’s reintegration that he return to the Netherlands, among other things for physical appointments and to begin treatment in the Netherlands. The employee did not do so, after which the employer stopped paying his wages.

The subdistrict court ruled that the employer’s request to return to the Netherlands for in-person appointments with the company physician was a reasonable requirement. By refusing to comply, the employee breached his reintegration obligations. According to the subdistrict court, the employer was therefore justified in suspending his pay.

In addition, the subdistrict court ruled that the fact that a second opinion had been requested did not suspend the ongoing reintegration obligations. In other words: as long as there is no other opinion from the company doctor, the employee must continue to comply with the existing agreements.

The essence of this ruling is that an employer may rely on the company doctor’s opinion when organizing the reintegration process. If the company doctor indicates that physical presence in the Netherlands is necessary and that there are no medical restrictions on travel, then an instruction to return is, in principle, a reasonable requirement. An employee must cooperate with this, unless there is an objective medical reason not to do so. If an employee fails to do so, the employer may suspend their wages.

Do you have any questions? Please feel free to contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Noa Bilogrevic.

You can read the ruling here.