News

Preparing tax returns for a fee alongside your job at the Tax and Customs Administration? The subdistrict court put a stop to that.

In a ruling dated January 22, 2026, the subdistrict court ruled that an employee of the Tax and Customs Administration had acted in violation of the prohibition on secondary employment and had acted in a seriously culpable manner by preparing tax returns in the evenings for a fee and consulting his employer's internal systems in the process.

What happened?

The Tax and Customs Administration suspected that an employee was preparing tax returns and providing tax advice in the evenings in exchange for payment. The employee was also said to be consulting the Tax and Customs Administration's internal systems. 

The Tax and Customs Administration invited the employee in question for a meeting. During this meeting, the employee stated that he had repeatedly provided tax advice to acquaintances and family members in exchange for payment. It later emerged that the employee had helped more people. After this meeting, the employee was suspended in the interests of the organization on suspicion of a serious breach of integrity. 

In these proceedings, the State requested that the employment contract with the employee be terminated because the employee had acted in a seriously culpable manner.

The subdistrict court ruled that the employee had acted in a seriously culpable manner because he:

• had acted in violation of the prohibition on secondary employment;
• it has been established that he accessed the Tax and Customs Administration's systems without authorization, and
• it has been established that he used the information obtained from the systems without authorization for his prohibited tax advice.

The employee also knew that what he was doing was not permitted. The Tax and Customs Administration's intranet clearly states that you may only consult the internal systems to the extent necessary for your work. It also states that the use of confidential information for, among other things, secondary activities is considered a serious breach of integrity. It should be noted that when logging in, the employee was repeatedly shown a message warning him that use of the systems would be logged and misuse would be punished.

In addition, the subdistrict court emphasized the special position of the Tax and Customs Administration in society, the large amount of data it holds on citizens and businesses, and the fact that Tax and Customs Administration employees have a special responsibility to ensure that citizens' trust in the Tax and Customs Administration is not undermined.

The subdistrict court concluded that the employment contract was terminated with immediate effect due to seriously culpable conduct and that the employee was not entitled to a transition payment, with the employee being ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Although secondary employment is permitted in principle, an employer may still prohibit certain secondary employment on objective grounds. Do you have questions about secondary employment by your employee or would you like to know whether your policy is still up to date? Please contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema and Elke Hofman-Bijvank. 

You can read the full ruling here. 

In its ruling of December 22, 2025, the District Court of The Hague had to assess whether it was permissible to deviate from an environmental permit that had been issued during the reconstruction of a building. The case concerned an office building in Leiden for which several environmental permits had been granted over the years, including for the conversion of the office building into residential studios, then from non-independent to independent living space, then for the demolition and reconstruction of the building, and finally, on January 31, 2022, an environmental permit for changing the use to a hotel function.

On February 17, 2023, a local resident submitted an enforcement request because the construction work was allegedly being carried out in deviation from the permit granted for the demolition and reconstruction of the building. Among other things, the fire compartmentation had been implemented differently and the facade had not been realized as specified in the permit.

The municipality only partially granted the enforcement request. For the other deviations, the council considered that either there was no violation or that the deviations had been legalized through approved revision drawings. The latter would mean that the environmental permit of January 31, 2022, would have been amended by the approval of the revision drawings. The local resident disagreed with this and appealed to the court. 

The court first explained the legal framework for changing a building plan and permit. A building plan may only be changed without a new environmental permit if the change is of a minor nature. Moreover, such a change is only possible if the permit to be changed is not yet irrevocable.

In the court's opinion, the legal framework was not complied with in this case. Firstly, the environmental permit of January 31, 2022 did not provide for permission to build at all, but only for the change of function to a hotel. Approving and stamping revision drawings as part of the environmental permit of January 31, 2022, cannot therefore in any case result in minor changes relating to construction being permitted. That was not what the permit was about at all.

Nor was it possible to regard the stamping and approval of the revised drawings as a minor change to the earlier permits, because those environmental permits were already irrevocable, meaning that no further changes were possible.

The court therefore ruled that violations had indeed occurred, because the deviations from the building plan were not permitted. The municipal executive should therefore have taken enforcement action.

Do you have any questions about the possibility of changing an environmental permit granted to you? Please contact Gerard van der Wende of Fleur Huisman.

You can read the ruling here. 

You have probably already seen it: the new coalition agreement. What is relevant in it for hiring self-employed professionals? It contains a clear message: self-employed professionals belong in a modern labor market in which the desire for autonomy is increasing. At the same time, D66, VVD, and CDA want more clarity about the boundary between self-employment and employment. That is the starting point for the course that is now being chosen.

The cabinet wants to introduce the Self-Employed Persons Act as soon as possible. This will not happen all at once, but in phases due to European obligations. The introduction is therefore deliberately being divided into steps so that it can keep pace with developments at the European level.

The first step consists of a combination of measures:

• The legal presumption of employment from the VBAR. It is explicitly stated that the clarification section will be removed from the VBAR. This means that the VBAR as a whole will not be implemented, but that one core component of it will serve as the starting point for the first phase. 
• Sectoral legal presumptions together with an assessment committee from the Self-Employed Persons Act. Sectoral legal presumptions indicate that specific principles may apply per sector, because practices vary from one sector to another. The assessment committee is intended as an additional assessment mechanism within the system of the Self-Employed Persons Act.

After this initial phase, the government wants to submit the rest of the Self-Employed Persons Act as soon as possible. The line is therefore clear. First, the legal presumption of employment, the sectoral legal presumptions, and the review committee will be introduced, after which the entire legal framework will be further elaborated and submitted.

The core of the agreement is that self-employment is explicitly recognized as part of the labor market, but at the same time there will be more structure and assessment around the question of when self-employment applies and when employment actually applies. 

What does this mean in practical terms?

For self-employed persons and clients, this is a signal to already take a critical look at the structure and documentation of the collaboration. Precisely because the first phase focuses on instruments that can more quickly determine the qualification of the employment relationship.

In short, you will still be able to hire self-employed persons in 2026, but the rules of the game will become more structured.

Do you have questions about hiring self-employed persons, the legal presumption of employment, or the structure of your contracts? Please contact one of our employment law specialists: Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Dennis Oud.

30 years of legal expertise, commitment, and a clear promise to our clients: “𝐖𝐢𝐣 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐚𝐧 𝐯𝐨𝐨𝐫 𝐮𝐰 𝐳𝐚𝐚𝐤. "⚖️

For three decades, we have been committed to representing our clients' interests, quality, and a personal approach, with an eye for both the legal framework and the people behind it. 

Today, we celebrated this special anniversary together at the office. With a delicious cake, champagne, and a beautiful bronze statue that all employees had specially made for this moment, we reflected on what has been built up over all these years.

It was especially nice to have Hans de Haij, our former colleague and friend, who is now retired, but was of course part of this milestone today.🥳

It was special to celebrate this with everyone from the office. We are proud of where we come from and look forward with confidence to everything that is yet to come! 

In a ruling dated 14 January 2026, the subdistrict court judge was presented with a considerable number of complaints from an employee about her employer. An employee of a local authority suffered from burnout, later contracted Covid-19 and developed long Covid. The Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) awarded her a WIA benefit (80–100%) and the local authority ultimately terminated her employment contract after two years due to long-term incapacity for work. The employee felt that the local authority had played a significant role in the cause of her incapacity for work and that the local authority had acted in a seriously culpable manner before, during and after the reintegration process. Her request included fair compensation of € 130,000 and various wage and cost items.

The subdistrict court judge immediately set the tone: the bar for fair compensation in situations like this is high. Very high. Not only must there be seriously culpable acts or omissions, but also a causal link between those acts and the termination. In other words, “it wasn't perfect” is not the same as “this is so serious that it justifies fair compensation.

Before the absence, the main issue was work pressure. According to the subdistrict court, this was plausibly high, but that does not automatically constitute grounds for “serious culpability”. It is relevant that, following a memo in which the work pressure was raised, the municipality immediately scheduled a meeting, engaged an external absenteeism counsellor and arranged extra support for the team. The employee claimed that this was all insufficient, but according to the subdistrict court, it was not made sufficiently clear that the employee subsequently indicated that the measures were inadequate or that she had requested more help. Without the employer knowing (or having to know) that things were really going wrong, it is difficult to say afterwards: ‘you knowingly did nothing’.

In addition, the subdistrict court also looks at what was going on outside of work. The documents show that the burnout is not only linked to work factors; non-work-related causes are also mentioned. There was also a second opinion from a company doctor who felt that a report to the Dutch Centre for Occupational Diseases was justified, and ultimately that report was made. However, the magistrate emphasises that this second opinion is based on information provided by the employee, which the municipality disputed, and therefore does not accept this opinion “without further ado”. The result: it cannot be established that the burnout was caused by seriously culpable conduct on the part of the municipality. The judge therefore does not address the question of whether the burnout made the employee more susceptible to long COVID.

The magistrate is critical of the reintegration process, and to be fair, the municipality deserves some criticism in this regard. Responses were not always prompt, agreements were not always honoured, and contact was not constant (there was even a period of five months without contact, which the municipality did not dispute). It also took a long time for the medical file to be transferred when the company doctor changed. That does not sound like a tightly organised reintegration process, but rather like “where is that file again?”. But even this does not reach the threshold of serious culpability. Moreover, according to the subdistrict court, the necessary causal link with the dismissal is missing, because the medical assessments repeatedly showed that there were no usable options. The UWV stated that no reintegration opportunities had been missed and that the municipality had made sufficient efforts.

The employee also invoked incapacity for work "in and through the service" (an article in the Municipalities Collective Labour Agreement that, among other things, entitles the employee to a supplement to the WIA), but this also failed. According to the subdistrict court, there was insufficient evidence that the working conditions were objectively excessive; high work pressure alone is not sufficient for this.

The council is largely correct in terms of content, but there are a few issues with wages where things go wrong and the magistrate is less lenient. In May 2024, the employee was underpaid due to an error in the settlement with the WIA benefit. This was later rectified with a net additional payment of € 1,658.58. Because this was done too late, the municipality also has to pay a (moderate) statutory increase of € 340.01 net and statutory interest on € 1,658.58 for the period from 17 May 2024 to 20 June 2024.

The subdistrict court also ruled that the municipality had wrongfully deducted amounts from the IKB in November and December 2024. The municipality must therefore pay € 1,366.98 gross in back pay, plus a statutory increase (moderate to 25%) and statutory interest.

Not everything is awarded. The pension contributions withheld do not have to be refunded and the costs of the mindfulness training are not reimbursed, because this was not prescribed by the company doctor and was not agreed in advance with the local authority.

This ruling shows that the threshold for seriously culpable conduct in the event of dismissal after long-term incapacity for work remains high, even if the reintegration process does not run smoothly. At the same time, it shows how quickly an error in payroll accounting or an incorrect deduction can lead to additional costs (statutory increase and interest). So, even if the legal course of action is perfectly in order, if the payslip goes haywire, you will still have to pay. 

Do you have any questions about long-term absenteeism and reintegration files? Please contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema or Elke Hofman-Bijvank.

You can read the ruling here. 

It is a common misconception that citizens or companies can object to and/or appeal against every decision made by an administrative body. In practice, this often leads to confusion and misunderstanding.

In its ruling of January 12, 2026, the Midden-Nederland District Court clarified why objections and appeals are not always possible. The ruling concerned the following. The municipal council of Zeist approved a decision in principle to redevelop an office location into a residential area. At the same time, the council adopted an amendment setting out the level of participation for the further elaboration of the plan.

The Better Zeist Foundation disagreed with the amendment because it considered the level of participation to be too low, which would limit its influence on the planning process. The foundation therefore lodged an objection to the amendment. The municipal council declared the objection inadmissible because, in its view, no objection could be lodged against the amendment. The foundation then lodged an appeal.

The ruling first explains the concept of a decision as defined in the General Administrative Law Act (Awb). A decision is a written decision by an administrative body that constitutes a legal act under public law. The latter point is particularly important. A legal act must be aimed at a legal effect: it must create, change, or terminate rights, obligations, or powers, or determine the legal status of a person or matter.

Not every choice made by an administrative body is therefore a decision within the meaning of the Awb. If the choice has no legal effect, it cannot be qualified as a decision.

The court ruled that the amendment was not a decision. This is because the amendment does not change the rights or obligations of citizens, does not grant or withdraw powers, and only contains a political-administrative choice about how participation in a preliminary phase is organized. The actual legal consequences will only arise later, when the environmental plan is adopted, which is open to appeal. The appeal was therefore declared unfounded.

Value was therefore attached to the phase of the process to which the amendment related. As this concerned a choice for the preliminary phase, there were no legal consequences as yet. According to the court, these would only arise at a later stage, when the environmental plan was adopted.

What does this mean in practice? Citizens and businesses cannot seek legal remedies at any stage of the decision-making process. In most cases, they must wait for the “final decision.” 

Are you wondering at which stage of a decision-making process an objection or appeal is possible? Or do you encounter similar questions in practice? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman for advice. 

You can read the ruling here.