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Firing an employee on the spot for using ChatGPT on a work laptop? That might sound harsh, but legally, it’s not that simple. And that’s exactly where things went wrong in this case.

In this ruling by the Zeeland-West-Brabant District Court, the case involved an employee on sick leave who had, among other things, entered search queries via ChatGPT on his company laptop regarding dismissal and potential severance pay. The employer, along with other allegations, saw this as grounds for immediate dismissal. But the district court judge drew a clear line through that.

Why? Because private use of the laptop was apparently not prohibited. The employer had not indicated anywhere that this was prohibited, so the labor court judge assumed that private use of the laptop was permitted. The use of ChatGPT was therefore not automatically a misuse of company resources. Nor was it shown that confidential company information had been shared. This made this aspect, at most, a minor offense, but not serious enough to warrant immediate dismissal. 

The most important lesson for employers, however, lies elsewhere. In the termination letter, the employer had listed seven reasons without making it clear that each of those reasons could, on its own, justify immediate termination. Legally, this constitutes a composite cause for immediate termination. Consequently, all seven elements must be proven. That did not happen. As a result, the immediate termination was overturned. Sometimes, therefore, the greatest risk lies not in the behavior itself, but in how the termination letter sets the case in motion.

What can employers learn from this?

1. Formulate the grounds for dismissal very precisely and strategically;
2. make it clear that the behaviors mentioned, both individually and collectively, constitute grounds for immediate dismissal; 
3. do not list too many allegations at once unless each point can be firmly substantiated;
4. clearly define in your policies what is and is not permitted regarding company resources, including for personal use. 

Not sure whether a termination letter, IT policy, or protocol is legally sound? In that case, a quick review beforehand is often more cost-effective than litigation later on. Please feel free to contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank and Noa Bilogrevic, and for more information. 

An employee falls on his knee while at work on October 9, 2024. He reports sick shortly thereafter (on October 16 and 17), continues working for a short time, but reports sick again on November 13, 2024, and remains unable to work thereafter. In the first months of 2025, the company doctor assesses him as fully unable to work for (reintegration) activities. So far, this appears to be a “classic” sick leave case with a reintegration process.

But then, in early June 2025, the employer hears something that changes the situation: the employee is said to have briefly performed operator work at another company during his sick leave on October 16 and 17, 2024. This is particularly sensitive because, although he was permitted by the employer to work as a self-employed contractor at other companies, reporting sick while simultaneously working elsewhere naturally raises questions. The employer engages an investigative agency to look into the employee’s activities during his incapacity for work.

In July 2025, the employee tells the employer that he is not getting better, that he must rest completely, that he is unable to meet in person, and that he cannot drive. However, the investigation report shows that he has driven on multiple occasions, carried a large shopping bag, and walked without any abnormal gait. The employer requests an explanation, announces immediate termination, and gives the employee the opportunity to respond (hearing both sides of the story). The employee is summarily dismissed.

The employee requests that the dismissal be overturned. He argues that he is genuinely ill, is undergoing treatment, and that an employer cannot determine his medical condition or whether he is ill based on an observation report. That determination is reserved for the company physician. It is only during the hearing that an explanation emerges: he claims he drove because his father had to go to the hospital and he needed to translate, and later because he had to go to BioZorg for an appointment related to his return-to-work program. He says he took painkillers and oxazepam for this. He also acknowledges that he worked for two days at another company, but that he did not know this was not permitted while on sick leave.

The subdistrict court upholds the summary dismissal. Not because the judge says the employee is not sick, but because the core issue here revolves around trust and honesty regarding work capacity. An employer must be able to rely on a (sick) employee to communicate openly and truthfully. The judge noted, among other things, that it is difficult to reconcile the fact that a home visit was “not possible” while driving and attending appointments were feasible, that no explanation was provided for the normal walking behavior that was observed, and that the use of heavy medication directly contradicts the claim that he was able to drive while taking it. Since no plausible explanation was provided, the employer was entitled to conclude that trust had been irreparably damaged.

And then there is the remarkable conclusion: despite the legally valid summary dismissal, the labor court judge nevertheless awards a transition payment. Normally, such compensation is not payable in the case of a justified summary dismissal, but here, due to the circumstances (still fully incapacitated for work, sole breadwinner, seven years of service, and no prior incidents), € 12,202.10 gross was nevertheless awarded pursuant to Article 7:673(8) of the Dutch Civil Code (with interest accruing fourteen days after the decision). 

This ruling demonstrates how quickly a disrupted relationship of trust during illness can escalate and how seriously the court views consistent, transparent communication regarding work capacity.

You can read the ruling here. 

An employee calls in sick while staying abroad. Can the employer then require the employee to return to the Netherlands for an examination by the company doctor? And what if the employee refuses?

A recent ruling shows that, under certain circumstances, an employer may indeed require an employee to return to the Netherlands for an examination by the company doctor. If the employee refuses to cooperate, a suspension of pay may be justified.

In this case, an employee traveled to Portugal due to a family emergency. His dog, which was staying with his mother, was dying and could no longer be cared for by his mother. One day after his dog’s death, the employee reported sick with physical and psychological symptoms. The employee sent the employer a “certificate of temporary incapacity,” stating that he was temporarily unable to travel. The company doctor in the Netherlands saw things differently. According to the company doctor, there was no medical restriction on travel, and it was necessary for the employee’s reintegration that he return to the Netherlands, among other things for physical appointments and to begin treatment in the Netherlands. The employee did not do so, after which the employer stopped paying his wages.

The subdistrict court ruled that the employer’s request to return to the Netherlands for in-person appointments with the company physician was a reasonable requirement. By refusing to comply, the employee breached his reintegration obligations. According to the subdistrict court, the employer was therefore justified in suspending his pay.

In addition, the subdistrict court ruled that the fact that a second opinion had been requested did not suspend the ongoing reintegration obligations. In other words: as long as there is no other opinion from the company doctor, the employee must continue to comply with the existing agreements.

The essence of this ruling is that an employer may rely on the company doctor’s opinion when organizing the reintegration process. If the company doctor indicates that physical presence in the Netherlands is necessary and that there are no medical restrictions on travel, then an instruction to return is, in principle, a reasonable requirement. An employee must cooperate with this, unless there is an objective medical reason not to do so. If an employee fails to do so, the employer may suspend their wages.

Do you have any questions? Please feel free to contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Noa Bilogrevic.

You can read the ruling here.

On February 12, 2026, the District Court of The Hague issued an interesting ruling regarding the termination of an employment contract due to a breakdown in the working relationship. The ruling demonstrates that while an employer may not always succeed in terminating a contract on the basis of “e-grounds” (integrity issues and alleged fraud), it can ultimately achieve termination on the basis of “g-grounds” (irreparable damage to trust) if the trust between the parties has been irreparably damaged.

In this case, Stedin accused an employee with a very long tenure of having committed fraud regarding working hours and of engaging in so-called “time theft.” The employer based its case, among other things, on discrepancies between records in internal systems and data from the company vehicle’s tracking system. The subdistrict court ruled that there was indeed culpable conduct, but not that fraud had been committed intentionally. A factor in this ruling was that the employee had argued he had difficulty with the registration system and that Stedin, partly in view of his long service record, should have provided him with better guidance. The “e” ground therefore did not hold up.

Nevertheless, the employment contract was terminated because the employment relationship had by then become seriously and permanently disrupted. At the hearing, the supervisor and the investigators remained convinced that fraud had occurred, making a normal return to the position no longer considered realistic. The employee therefore received the transition allowance, but no fair compensation. According to the subdistrict court, there was no serious culpable conduct on the part of Stedin, in part because, under the given circumstances, it was not unreasonable for them to have initiated an integrity investigation and to have lost trust. The ruling thus underscores that an unsubstantiated ground for termination need not preclude termination if the allegations and the subsequent proceedings have permanently damaged the employment relationship.

As an employer, however, be aware that the cause of the disrupted employment relationship must not lie with you. In that case, the threshold for grossly culpable conduct and fair compensation for the employee is easily met. 

Do you have any questions? Please feel free to contact Dennis Oud, Tessa Sipkema, Elke Hofman-Bijvank, or Noa Bilogrevic. 

You can read the ruling here.

Many municipalities include requirements in an environmental permit that project proponents must comply with. These may include, for example, requirements regarding the use of a building or plot of land, or conditions pertaining to the creation of green spaces. For municipalities, this is an effective way to regulate the implementation of an environmental permit while simultaneously imposing obligations on the project proponent.

However, the inclusion of regulations is not unlimited. In its ruling of March 5, 2026, the Gelderland District Court set clear limits on what municipalities may and may not attach as a regulation to an environmental permit.

The ruling concerned a temporary environmental permit for the use of an existing warehouse for the storage of pallets. That use did not fit within the zoning plan, which meant an environmental permit was required. Initially, the permit application was denied, but following a valid objection, an environmental permit was ultimately granted. However, various conditions were attached to that environmental permit, including mandatory camera surveillance on the property.

The applicant disagreed with a number of conditions, including those regarding mandatory video surveillance, and filed an appeal. The court then had to determine whether the conditions were lawful. The municipality argued that video surveillance was necessary to monitor complaints from local residents, make supervision more efficient, and verify compliance with the other conditions.

The court ruled that camera surveillance could not be included as a regulation in the environmental permit. Regulations accompanying an environmental permit must, in fact, be focused on spatial planning. CCTV surveillance does not pertain to spatial planning, but rather to supervision and enforcement. The municipality therefore had no relevant spatial interest in imposing this requirement and was thus not permitted to include CCTV surveillance as such in the environmental permit.

What does this mean in practice? Although the municipality has some discretion when including conditions in an environmental permit, the inclusion of such conditions must always be linked to a relevant spatial interest. 

Do you have questions about (applying for) an environmental permit? Please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman.

You can read the ruling here. 

The Fixed-Term Rental Contracts Act came into force on July 1, 2024. This Act marks a significant change in tenancy law and has far-reaching consequences for both tenants and landlords. Whereas since 2016 it has been possible to enter into temporary leases of up to two years for independent living space and five years for non-independent living space, this practice has largely come to an end. With this legislative change, the legislator aims to increase the housing security of tenants.

What has changed?

The core of the Fixed-Term Rental Contracts Act is that, from now on, rental agreements will in principle be entered into for an indefinite period. This restores the principle of tenancy law that fixed-term contracts are the norm and temporary contracts are only permitted in exceptional cases. For tenants, this means greater legal protection and continuity, while landlords have less freedom to terminate the tenancy without cause.

However, the law still allows a limited number of exceptions. For example, temporary rentals remain possible in the case of hospita rentals, where the landlord lives in the property himself and rents out part of it. Temporary contracts may also be concluded for rentals to students under certain conditions, provided that the use of the living space is demonstrably related to enrollment at an educational institution or is permitted in the event of a social emergency.

It is noteworthy that the law does not currently provide for an explicit exception for migrant workers. This target group is being further elaborated in separate regulations, which are still under development at the time of writing. Until these further details are available, the housing of migrant workers will generally be based on the short stay principle. This means that extra attention must be paid to the qualification of the agreement and the actual arrangement of the use, in order to prevent it from still being considered a regular rental with rent protection.

Consequences for landlords

For landlords, this legislative change means that they will have to think more critically in advance about the type of contract they choose. Whereas temporary contracts previously offered a flexible and relatively accessible solution, that flexibility is now severely restricted. This requires not only a conscious choice when entering into the lease agreement, but also careful documentation of the reason why a temporary rental is permitted. The focus is thus shifting from flexibility in advance to legal sustainability afterwards. In practice, there is a fear that this will make some private landlords more cautious, which could put further pressure on the already scarce supply in the rental market. It remains important to note that temporary rental agreements concluded before July 1, 2024, will continue to be governed by the old law, while new contracts will be governed by the new law.

Consequences for tenants

For tenants, the law primarily provides greater certainty and protection. The likelihood that they will have to look for new accommodation after one or two years is significantly reduced. In this way, the legislator aims to contribute to a greater sense of security, particularly in a tight housing market where moving on is not a given. At the same time, the law does not solve the structural shortage of affordable housing. The number of available homes will not increase, but the position of tenants who have already found a home will be strengthened.

Practice

In the coming period, there will be particular discussion about rental agreements concluded after July 1, 2024, for a fixed term, for example with a term of two years. From a legal point of view, this moment is not coincidentally relevant. Until the Fixed-Term Rental Contracts Act came into force, it had been permitted since 2016 to conclude temporary rental agreements of up to two years for independent living space. As a result, many landlords and tenants have become accustomed to this type of contract.

Precisely because this practice has been the norm for many years, there is a risk that landlords will continue to conclude two-year contracts after July 1, 2024, assuming that this is legally permissible. In reality, unless a legal exception applies, such a contract can be regarded as a lease for an indefinite period. This means that the tenant enjoys full rent protection and the lease cannot simply be terminated at the end of the contract period.

Now that the first contracts concluded after July 1, 2024, for a period of two years are approaching their end date, this could lead to a tipping point in practice. At that point, landlords may be confronted with the fact that they assumed they had concluded a temporary contract, while from a legal point of view it may be an indefinite agreement with associated rent protection. This area of tension is expected to lead to increasingly frequent discussions and possibly also to legal proceedings, with case law having to provide guidance on the application of the new law.

If you have a dispute regarding your lease agreement, please do not hesitate to contact one of our real estate lawyers for advice!