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An employee asks for more hours, fewer hours, different working hours or perhaps a permanent contract. This sounds like an informal request, but if it can be seen as a request within the meaning of the Flexible Working Act (Wfw), there are clear rules attached to it. One is that the employer must respond within the stipulated time limit. A second important condition may be that an employer must provide a justification if the request is rejected. If the employer fails to do so, the court may ‘automatically’ grant the request.

This automatic granting of an employment contract for an indefinite period of time has already been shown in a 2024 ruling by the cantonal judge in Limburg. The employee had requested a permanent contract in writing a few months before the expiry of her fixed-term contract. Since the Transparent and Predictable Terms of Employment Act, such requests are also covered by the Wfw. The employer should have responded to this request within one month in writing, giving reasons. Although the employer had given written notice that the employment contract would not be renewed, no motivation was given to the employee's request. The court therefore ruled that the request had to be granted.

Incidentally, this did not help the employee in question much as she was late in starting her proceedings.

A turnaround?

But then is the soup really always eaten so hot? No it is not necessarily so. See, for example, a (very) recent decision of the North Holland court in this regard. Here, an employee had applied to increase his employment rate from 90 to 100 per cent.  

The only issue here was that this employee was already supernumerary and exempt from work. Thus, the employee's application seemed to have been made with the sole purpose of receiving a higher salary during his exemption from work, or higher severance pay. The court ruled that the Flexible Working Act was not designed for this purpose and that it must have been obvious to the employee that his request would be rejected. Also, the employee had not complained in time. So the absence of a written rejection including motivation does not always mean that the request is automatically granted. 

What should an entrepreneur learn from this? 

• Don't leave requests unanswered. Whether it is for more hours, fewer hours or conversion to an open-ended contract always respond ánd in writing.
• Pay attention to the deadline. There is often a statutory response period to these kinds of requests. In principle, this is one month. Be alert to this and do not let it expire.
• Be clear in your communication. Even if you cannot or will not (yet) comply with the request, indicate clearly and in good time why not.
• Distinguish between loose wishes and serious requests. A loose remark in the corridors is somewhat different from a clear request by e-mail. But as soon as an employee makes a serious request, it is important to respond seriously as well, because it could very well be a Wfw request. 

Have you received a request from an employee to amend the employment contract and are unsure how to deal with it? Feel free to contact one of our employment law specialists: Dennis Oud, Elke Hofman, Tessa Sipkema of Tim van Riel.

De Haij & Van der Wende Advocaten will also be a sponsor of ZVH Volleyball Men's 1 for the 2025-2026 season.

The sponsorship contract was signed this morning by Dennis Oud on behalf of De Haij & Van der Wende Advocaten, together with Ralph Nenk (Scherp Verpakkingen) and Gert Zoet (former CSU director and member of the Men's 1 sponsorship committee).

With this extension, De Haij & Van der Wende supports the sporting ambitions of ZVH's first men's team in the Eredivisie.

We wish the team a successful season! 👊

Please note that this ruling is governed by the old law, which applied until 1 January 2024!

Padel courts are a hot topic in case law these days. However, where it normally deals with noise pollution, the ruling that will be discussed in this blog looks at something completely different.

In this case, in brief, the Division had to assess whether the municipal council of the municipality of Laren had rightly used the extensive preparatory procedure to (re)assess the permit application for the realisation of four padel courts and the installation of a fence.

The applicant had submitted a permit application to build four padel courts and a fence on her plot. This permit application had initially been granted through the regular preparation procedure. An objection was lodged against this decision, after which the college revoked the permit and decided to follow the extensive preparation procedure after all. The applicant appealed against this decision. The court ruled that the extensive procedure had been used unjustly, because although there was a conflict with the zoning plan, that conflict only concerned the glass walls around the padel courts, making it a minor case and the regular procedure should have been followed.

The Division then had to assess whether the court's judgment was correct. It confirmed that the height of the glass walls violated the zoning plan and therefore required an environmental permit to deviate from the zoning plan. Unlike the court, however, the Division ruled that the paving and the enclosure, including glass walls, were functionally connected to each other, as a result of which the minor cases regulation did not apply and the college was right to follow the extensive preparation procedure.

This ruling shows that it does matter which preparatory procedure the administrative body uses to assess a permit application. If the wrong procedure is followed, this may mean that the permit application must be reassessed.

You can read the decision of the Council of State here.

What started as a handy app to find a cleaner ended in a legal clean-up for Helpling. The Supreme Court ruled on 11 April 2025 that the cleaners who worked through the platform were not self-employed but temporary workers. And that has implications, including for employers outside the cleaning industry.

Helpling worked as follows: households posted cleaning orders via the platform and cleaners could respond. They largely set their own schedule and rate (within limits set by Helpling), but had to work by the platform's rules, use the payment method Helpling prescribed, and receive reviews from their customers. It all seemed very flexible, but under the bonnet Helpling determined a surprising amount.

The Supreme Court looked through that flexibility and upheld the court's verdict: this is a temporary employment arrangement within the meaning of Section 7:690 of the Civil Code. And remarkably, the fact that the cleaners did not work in a company or organisation, but in people's homes, does not matter. A private household can also be a hirer. What matters is that someone temporarily performs work under the supervision and direction of another person, and that was the case here.

What can employers learn from this? Firstly, that the legal qualification of an employment relationship does not depend on labels or fancy terms, but on how things work in practice. Secondly, that even a platform that claims to be just an intermediary can still turn out to be an employer if it actually shapes and controls the employment relationship.

So for employers who work with freelancers or platforms, this is another wake-up call: make sure the legal and actual reality are aligned. The risks of false self-employment and misqualified employment relationships lurk.

Do you have questions about using freelancers or are you working with a platform model? If so, feel free to contact our employment law specialists.

In a previous blog, I have already discussed in detail the relationship between the principle duty of enforcement and the principle of proportionality. For an explanation of the relationship between these two concepts, I refer you to that blog.

In the judgment of the interim relief judge of the Limburg District Court of 24 April 2025, which is discussed in this blog, this relationship came up again. The subject of this ruling was an order under penalty imposed on the plaintiff in this case for converting two stables without the necessary environmental permit. The order required the plaintiff to return the stables to the licensed situation. The plaintiff lodged an objection and later an appeal against this decision of the college and the decision on the objection, inter alia because it considered that enforcement action was disproportionate in relation to the objectives to be served by it. This is because the stables being converted were legally erected in 1973 and may therefore remain on site. Enforcement action against the construction work on the stables, the use of the stables and/or the solar panels installed on the roofs cannot therefore achieve the goal of reducing petrification in the outlying area. The college, on the other hand, believes that enforcement is mainly concerned with restoring the property to its lawful state and complying with planning regulations, and that in addition, there is also a third-party enforcement request.

The interim relief judge referred to the Harderwijk decision and ruled as follows. Although the judge in preliminary relief proceedings could follow the municipal executive as regards compliance with the planning rules, he did question whether enforcement action was proportionate in this case, especially the question of the purpose of enforcement and its necessity. The preliminary relief judge then ruled that the third-party's interests were not served by returning the stables to their lawful, licensed but also dilapidated state, because the third-party only wanted the stables to be removed in their entirety. Regarding the public interest, the interim relief judge ruled that the enforcement that has just taken place does not serve those public interests. The conclusion, therefore, is that the board did not give sufficient reasons why enforcement action is proportionate in this case.

Do you have any questions about the principle of proportionality and the duty to enforce? If so, please contact Gerard van der Wende or Fleur Huisman.

You can read the ruling here.

On 8 December 2024, the new Product Liability Directive (EU) 2024/2853 came into force. The old Directive had been in force in the European Union since 1985 in case a defective product results in damage. This Directive was a good basis, but with all the (technical) developments in the past 40 years, such as AI, the Directive really needed modernisation. This blog looks at some of the changes and what this could mean for producers and consumers.

Concept of product

As indicated, the old Directive dates back to 1985. At that time, the term “product” was still quite clear; it simply meant a physical, tangible object. However, technology has advanced so much that this assumption is outdated. In the new directive, the term “product” has therefore been considerably broadened and extended to include digital variants. Think, for instance, of software, AI systems and digital services.

For example, a product can function thanks to a digital component - as in the case of a smart thermostat or a robot hoover. The software that makes this functioning possible is also considered a product thanks to the new directive, and its developer is thus considered a producer. Software that functions independently - such as autonomous AI applications - also falls within the scope of the directive.

In short: it has long since ceased to be only traditional manufacturers of tangible goods who are at risk of product liability. Software developers, digital service providers and platform providers can now also fall under this liability.

Concept of damage

Now that the concept of “product” has been broadened, the picture of what constitutes “damage” within the framework of product liability is also changing. Whereas previously only personal injury or material damage was covered, this has been significantly expanded under the new directive. Thus, immaterial damage is now also recognised - provided it has been medically established. Think of demonstrable psychological damage resulting from a defective product.

In addition, damage due to loss of or damage to digital data has also been added as a new category. A concrete example is the erasure of an entire data set due to a defect in software or AI systems. Such digital damage has often been difficult to legally qualify until now, but with this directive, it gets a clear place within the liability regime.

Lower limit

Under the old directive, an important threshold applied: only damage above € 500,00 was eligible for compensation. This meant that consumers with relatively small claims - think broken glasses or damaged laptops - were often left empty-handed. That limit has been completely abolished with the new directive.

This change significantly lowers the threshold for making a claim. Consumers can now claim compensation even for smaller amounts of damage. This makes liability law more accessible and more attuned to the reality in which even limited digital damage can be impactful.

In addition, it is no longer required that the product is exclusively for private use. Even when a product is partially used for business purposes, an injured party can rely on the directive. This is relevant, for instance, for self-employed persons or small businesses that use technology or equipment in their daily business operations.

Burden of proof relief for victims

In many product liability cases, consumers run into a familiar problem: providing evidence. Proving that a product is defective and that this defect caused the damage often turns out to be quite a challenge in practice. Especially with complex or digital products, where technical knowledge lies with producers, the information gap for consumers is considerable.

The new directive accommodates consumers in this respect by introducing the term ‘legal presumptions’. In certain cases, it may be presumed that a product was defective and that there is a causal link between the defect and the damage suffered. This significantly eases the burden of proof.

Moreover, judges are given the power to require manufacturers to produce internal product information - for example, on design, manufacturing or software operation. This information can be decisive in substantiating a claim and gives consumers a stronger starting position against professional parties.

Conclusion

The new rules make one thing clear: product liability has been radically modernised and broadened. Consumers are given more options to get their damages compensated, while the number of parties that can be considered producers has been significantly expanded. In doing so, the EU is responding to a society in which digital technologies are at least as decisive as physical products and in which user protection must be central. EU member states have until 9 December 2026 to transpose the directive into national law.

Do you have a product liability problem? Ask one of our Corporate Law lawyers for advice!